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ABSTRACT
CYBER-ASSETS AT RISK (CAR): MONETARY IMPACT OF PERSONALLY
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION DATA BREACHES ON COMPANIES
Omer Ilker Poyraz
Old Dominion University, 2020
Director: Dr. C. Ariel Pinto
Cyber-systems provide convenience, ubiquity, economic advantage, and higher
efficiency to both individuals and organizations. However, vulnerabilities of the cyber domain
also offer malicious actors with the opportunities to compromise the most sensitive information.
Recent cybersecurity incidents show that a group of hackers can cause a massive data breach,
resulting in companies losing competitive advantage, reputation, and money. Governments have
since taken some actions in protecting individuals and companies from such crime by
authorizing federal agencies and developing regulations. To protect the public from losing their
most sensitive records, governments have also been compelling companies to follow
cybersecurity regulations. If companies are unsuccessfully protecting their customers' records,
they are levied by the government agencies. Companies also may face litigation from individuals
after the breach. If the company is a public company, then it must provide more details about the
incident.
Data breach incidents are one of the significant concerns that organizations have been
experiencing for a while. Quantifying the data breach risk into monetary language is a problem
that organizations still try to solve due to the unavailability of the data and indirect costs. The
cost incurred by personally identifiable information (PII) data breaches may even exceed one
billion dollars. Therefore, the monetary cost of a PII data breach is an essential phenomenon that
organizations need to forecast and be prepared to mitigate the impact.

The purpose of this study is to identify the correlation between the dependent and
independent variables and to develop a predictive model to quantify the monetary value of the
PII data breaches with multiple regression.
This study introduces two new categories for personal information; these are PII and
sensitive PII. This new taxonomy accentuates the impact of sensitive information, which is more
costly than not sensitive personal information. Next, this study also presents significant results
that demonstrate the correlations between revenue, PII, SPII, and class-action lawsuits, and the
dependent variable, which is the total cost of the data breach. Also, specific models developed in
this study are able to predict the responses for new observations.
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Mean Failure Cost
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National Institute of Standards and Technology

OLS

Ordinary Least Square

PII

Personally Identifiable Information

PRC

Privacy Rights Clearinghouse

PRESS

Prediction Error Sum of Squares

RMF

Risk Management Framework

ROI

Return on Investment

SEC

Securities Exchange Commission
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Society of Risks Analysis

SSN

Social Security Number

US

United States

VaR

Value at Risk
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Variation Inflation Factor
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Overview
News of cybersecurity breaches against business or government organizations is

becoming frequent in the media. Speed and capability of Information Technology services grow
and provide people and organizations ease of use, convenience, and ubiquity. As a result,
dependency on the Internet has been increasing and criticality and strength of dependency as
well. However, even though cyber-defense mechanisms have been developing, carrying out
cyber-attacks is becoming easier while the impact of those attacks has been drastically increasing
(Ashford, 2018; Paganini, 2013). Many firms, critical infrastructures, and public services now
operate in private, public, or hybrid clouds. Operating in cloud computing enables organizations
to have ubiquity, communicate, and make transactions on-demand. However, the Internet and
cloud computing also poses an opportunity for malicious actors.
Cyber-systems provide convenience, ubiquity, economic advantage, and higher
efficiency to both individuals and organizations. However, vulnerabilities of the cyber domain
also provide malicious actors with the opportunities to compromise the most sensitive
information of people and organizations. Recent cybersecurity incidents (Ponemon, 2019) show
that a group of hackers can cause a massive data breach, which eventually results in companies
losing competitive advantage, reputation, and money.
Governments have since taken some actions in protecting individuals and companies
from such crime by authorizing federal agencies, developing regulations, or issuing laws. To
protect the public from losing their most sensitive records, which are kept in organizations’
databases, governments have also been compelling companies to follow cybersecurity
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regulations, purchase cybersecurity systems, and employ security experts. If companies are
unsuccessful in protecting their customers' records, then they may be fined by the government.
Companies also may face litigation from individuals after the breach. If the company is a public
company, then it must provide more details about the incident in their yearly reports.

1.2

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to develop a model to identify the correlation between the

monetary impact of personally identifiable information (PII) data breaches and the predictor
variables and develop a predictive model to quantify the monetary value of the PII data breaches.
This study will categorize the information according to its criticality, high and low. The
model aims to provide a better understanding of the monetary impact of a data breach from
companies while they collect personal information. Also, insurance firms can have a better risk
estimation of their insureds underwriting accurate cyber insurance premiums for data breach risk.

1.3

Problem Statement
Due to the nature of the cyber domain, any organization can suffer massive data breaches

even though they have avant-garde tools. However, organizations may not fully comprehend the
type of losses they can incur and are not able to forecast how much money they could lose.
Therefore, they may lack an understanding of cyber risk, and as a result, they may not be
prudently investing in cybersecurity. For strategic management, top-level management needs to
understand the cyber risk in a language that they can speak. When a manager knows the cyber
risk in monetary terms, it would be easier to make decisions such as accepting, transferring,
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mitigating, or avoiding risk. However, quantifying the cybersecurity risk into monetary language
is a problem that organizations still have not solved.
This study will only focus on PII data breach of cyber risk. Risk managers fail to assess
the PII data breach risk in a way that people from technical to strategic level positions can
communicate. As a result, the lack of understanding of data breach risk may lead to overlooking
cybersecurity investment.
Existing data breach datasets do not have a standard structure. As a result, there is not a
specific framework to conduct research. The particular impact of data breach incidents is
recorded in terms of people; however, in some cases, it is recorded counting the number of data.
Data breach incidents are one of the significant concerns that organizations have been
experiencing for a while. Quantifying the data breach risk into monetary language is a problem
that organizations still try to solve due to the unavailability of the data and indirect costs. The
cost incurred by PII data breach may reach hundreds of million dollars, which can severely affect
an organization’s financial health. Therefore, the monetary cost of a PII data breach is an
essential phenomenon that organizations need to forecast and be prepared to mitigate the impact.

1.4

Research Questions
There are plenty of studies that provide a solution to estimate the technical impact of a

cyber incident. However, there are very few studies that attempt to determine the monetary
impact of a data breach – both direct and latent costs. A novel attempt will be made to improve
the estimate of the monetary impact of a data breach.
The following questions are identified to frame this study:
1. What type of PII is stolen during data breaches?
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2. What type of cost results from PII data breaches?
3. What is the monetary impact of PII data breaches?
4. What are the possible independent variables that are related to the cost of data
breaches?

1.5

Significance of the Study
The proposed research has several contributions in the fields of cybersecurity and risk

management. The contributions of the research are examined under the following categories: (a)
Risk Management, (b) Security Economics.
a. Risk Management
The proposed research contributes to the field of risk management in two areas: risk
analysis and risk communication.
Risk Analysis
Risk is that future event that yields negative impacts without regarding intent that
includes software failures or accidents (Pinto & Magpili, 2015). According to the Society of
Risks Analysis (SRA) (Aven et al., 2015), risk analysis is defined as “Systematic process to
comprehend the nature of risk and to express the risk, with the available knowledge.” A general
risk formula is (Pinto & Garvey, 2012):
Risk = f(probability, impact)
Consequences or impact are other concepts that are used interchangeably with "Impact."
The proposed study will contribute to the impact section of the risk analysis of PII data breach.
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Risk Communication
According to the SRA, risk communication can be defined as exchanging risk-related
information among stakeholders (Aven et al., 2015). In general, decision making performed in
three echelons: technical, operational, and strategic. In cybersecurity, at the technical level,
capabilities of cybersecurity personnel depend on rapidly adapting existing knowledge into
solutions in the complex cybersecurity domain. All the security operations, such as upgrading
hardware-software, applying penetration tests, or employing anti-virus tools, can be
accomplished by holding a high level of technical expertise. Operation al level decision-makers
need to focus on legal, organizations, and the technical intersection of cybersecurity.
Governments develop law, frameworks, or regulations to strengthen organizations' cybersecurity
preparedness and compel them to follow specific rules and procedures. Therefore, operational
level decision-makers need to specialize in these subjects. Decision-makers of the strategic level
should be familiar with the impact of cyber threats to the business. Cybersecurity incidents may
have a monetary impact on business, and it can jeopardize a business's goal, maximizing the
profit.
Risk analysis can develop an intersection for all decision-making levels if a common
perception of risk is developed. Developing a common language among echelons will provide a
shared understanding and awareness of the risk. In this case, PII data breach can be assessed
better if the impact of the PII data breach can be translated into a monetary language. Hence, the
monetary impact calculation methodology of the proposed research will help the stakeholders
understand and communicate the data breach risk better.

6
b. Security Economics
Cybersecurity Investment
Cyber risk has been a significant concern for businesses and is listed as one of the top
five global risks with significant economic implications (World Economic Forum, 2016). Even
some companies such as FICO started to rate cyber risk of businesses, which is now considered
in investment decision-making (Lawrence, 2014). Chief Information Security Officers undertake
a more critical role in the company’s board of management as they are not only accountable for
keeping organizations secure from cyber-attacks. Also, they guide member of the strategic
management considering the effectiveness and efficiency of cybersecurity investments.
Companies invest in cybersecurity are effectively and efficiently observed to have less data
breach costs (Ponemon, 2019). To sum up, cyber risk management has become an emerging and
vital part of the enterprise risk management. Data breach risk is one of the significant risk items
of cyber risk; therefore, understanding the data breach risk and making efficient and effective
cybersecurity investment will reduce overall cyber risk and overall cost.
Since the proposed method will help to calculate the monetary impact of the PII data
breaches, top-level managers can make better decisions to manage the data breach and choose
the most economically profitable risk management strategy (i.e., acceptance, avoidance, transfer
or mitigation).
Cyber Insurance
Risk transfer is another option to handle cyber threats. The cyber insurance market has
been growing all over the world. The total cybersecurity insurance market in the United States
was $3.1 billion in 2017 (Matthews, 2018). In addition to companies, some cities like Dallas, San
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Diego, Denver, and Detroit already have cyber insurance to mitigate the cost of after a
cybersecurity incident (Calvert & Kamp, 2018).
One of the main issues of cyber risk insurance is the lack of ability of accurate data
breach risk calculation, particularly in monetary terms. The impact of the PII data breach model
also provides a solution to the underinsurance problem in data breach risk.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

2.1

Introduction
Cyber-crime is criminal activity carried out using computers and the Internet, including

downloading intellectual property, identity theft, hacking, or web defacement (Christensson,
2006). Cyber-crimes may cause monetary loss, reputation loss, and business interruption.
Cyber-crime has been carried out since 1973 when a teller at New York’s Dime Savings
Bank used a computer to embezzle $2 million (Wavefront, n.d.). Since then, the attack
sophistication and financial impact of cyber-crime have been increasing.
There have been studies to assess the cyber-risk, such as measuring the financial impact
of data breaches or determining the optimal amount of cybersecurity investment. Also, there
have been studies to develop standards, frameworks, and regulations to mitigate cyber risks.

2.2

Cybersecurity Risk Management

What is Risk?
Risk is the potential of undesired negative impacts on human life, property, or the
environment based on the probability and the impact of the event (Gratt, 1987). Another
definition is that risk is that future event that yields negative impacts without regarding intent
that includes software failures or accidents (Pinto & Magpili, 2015).
Risk can be formulated as follows (Pinto & Garvey, 2012):
Risk = f (probability, impact)
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Kaplan (1997)offered three questions and contributed by (Haimes, Kaplan, & Lambert,
2002) to develop a risk analysis framework. A precursor question is offered in addition to those
questions (Pinto, McShane, & Bozkurt, 2012):
0. What are the popular events?
1. What can go wrong?
2. What are the consequences?
3. What is the chance of occurrence?
4. What can be done to manage them?
5. What are the alternatives?
6. What are the effects on future decisions?
Risk Analysis is described by the Society of Risk Analysis as “Systematic process to
comprehend the nature of risk and to express the risk with the available knowledge.” (Aven et
al., 2015).
What is cyberspace?
NIST defines cyberspace as “A global domain within the information environment
consisting of the interdependent network of information systems infrastructures including the
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and
controllers.” (Kissel, 2013).
Cybersecurity Actors
There are different types of actors in the cyber domain. Anyone of them can, intentionally
or accidentally, cause the unavailability of the service or data breach. Those actors are:
Functional users: individuals or organizations for whom the cyber system was meant to be
useful.
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Security experts: individuals or organizations generate strategies, defense tools, products, and
techniques against hackers and malware.
Hackers: individuals or groups use their skills to gain benefits through hacking people,
organizations, or governments.
Insiders: employees of an organization may reveal administrative details to hackers or
themselves be able to disrupt their organizations’ operation as an act of revenge, i.e., disgruntled
insider.
Penetration Testers: check security vulnerabilities of web-based applications, networks, and
systems with the permission of that organization.
Organized crime: a group of criminals that target victims to demand money and extort
information.
Hacktivist: an individual or a group that carries out cyberattacks to draw attention to
humanitarian or global problems such as human rights, freedom of speech, or global climate.
Cyber-terrorist: a group of hackers organizes a cyber-attack to cause alarm, fear, or panic with a
political agenda.
Competitors: sometimes, a competitor can be the sponsor of an attack, such as hiring a hacker
group to conduct a distributed denial-of-service attack to disrupt competitors' service to damage
its reputation.
Law enforcement: organizations like INTERPOL, Department of Homeland Security, or
National Security Agency monitor cybercrimes.
Nation-States: an attack carried out by state-sponsored hackers.
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Cybersecurity Risk Management
Cybersecurity risk management is concerned with risks caused by cyber threats. Cyber
risk is caused by a cyber threat (Refsdal, Solhaug, & Stølen, 2015). Cybersecurity risk can be
defined as “operational risks to information and technology assets that have consequences
affecting the confidentiality, availability, or integrity of information or information systems.”
(Cebula & Young, 2010). An example of cyber risk is caused by a cyber threat like a virus or
denial of service attack.
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C-I-A) are three main objectives of
cybersecurity, and any incident can have a consequence on each of these objectives or their
combinations. In cybersecurity, incidents are categorized by C-I-A objectives. Cybersecurity
Risk management also focuses on ensuring these three pillars of cybersecurity (confidentiality,
integrity, and availability) by assessing and minimizing risk.
CIA principles are summarized below (Pinto, 2018):
Confidentiality: the principle prevents illegitimate users from accessing the information on a
computer or network. Confidentiality breaches cause disclosure of the data to illegitimate users.
Integrity: it ensures that unauthorized actors cannot adjust or destroy information. If changed, it
can be found out.
Availability: it enables that only authorized users can access to service or information.

2.3

Information Security Risk Assessment
Information security risk assessment is a primary element of an information security

management system that measures the effectiveness of the current security controls to detect
vulnerabilities and threats. Then, decide which safeguards to choose to address potential threats
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(Landoll, 2011; Shameli-sendi, Ezzati-jivan, Jabbarifar, & Dagenais, 2012). There are two types
of risk assessment methods; qualitative and quantitative.
2.3.1

Qualitative Methods
Qualitative risk assessment is measuring an event or regulatory control or security to

understand the quality of the operation (Hillestad, 2018). Qualitative risk assessment can be easy
and rapid to implement. Assessment of the risk is highly dependent on the assessor background,
perception, and environment of the organization. Therefore, a qualitative risk assessment may
become biased or subjective. Nevertheless, it is still essential and useful to assess the information
security risk.
Although the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed a
framework for critical infrastructure, any organization can apply the guideline regardless of the
size or severity of cybersecurity risk. The Framework empowers organizations to implement risk
management best practices and the principles to have robust security and resilience. It considers
the cybersecurity risk as part of organizational risk and overall risk management process. The
Framework comprises three parts: The Framework Core, the Implementation Tiers, and the
Framework Profiles. The Framework Core consists of a set of cybersecurity activities, outcomes,
and informative references. Elements of the Core deliver comprehensive guidance for creating
individual, organizational Profiles. With the use of Profiles, an organization can arrange and
prioritize cybersecurity activities with its business/mission requirements, risk tolerance, and
resources. The Tiers offer an instrument for organizations to assess the features of their approach
to managing cybersecurity risk (NIST, 2018).
Department of Defense (DoD) has developed a Risk Management Framework (RMF)
(DoDI 8010.01) to apply a risk-based approach to cybersecurity implementation, assessment,
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decision making, and monitoring. According to DoD (2015), cybersecurity is regarded as a riskbased activity with a mission-driven approach. The RMF is based on the NIST SP-800 series
documents. It brings a new method to federal organizations to assess their cyber risk to avoid any
mission disruption. DoD RMF has twenty security controls, which are assessed by experts as
“satisfied” or “other than satisfied.” DoD RMF is an iterative framework consisting of six steps
(DoD, 2015):
•

categorize the information system,

•

select security controls,

•

implement security controls,

•

assess security controls,

•

authorize the information system

•

monitor
Jones (2007) proposes a risk management framework for the management of information

risk. He discusses risk management steps and presents a framework that can be employed to
develop management structures that can be tried for their efficacy and generality.
Another paper presents an information risk management framework for a better understanding of
critical areas of focus in a cloud computing environment to identify threats and vulnerabilities
covering cloud service and deployment models (Zhang, Wuwong, Li, & Zhang, 2010). It follows
seven processes of Information Security Risk Management.
Organizations have limited resources to protect their assets. Therefore, they should
prioritize their assets according to their importance. Scholars offer to utilize a conceptual
framework in which security requirements are related to the organization's unique business
drivers (Su, Bolzoni, & Van Eck, 2006). The Framework has three parts:
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1. Business vision: high-level business goals
2. Critical Impact Factors (CIF): impact of the security violation on business
3. Valuable assets and their security requirements are inventories of security requirements.
They suggest:
•

Enumerate useful assets and their security requirements

•

Define the organization’s CIF and business vision

•

Link the security requirements with CIF and business vision

Business impact analysis identifies the organization's critical business function and
defines the impact of external and internal CIFs on the various parts of the organization. Figure 1
illustrates the concept offered by the authors (Su et al., 2006).

Figure 1. Business Impact Analysis

2.3.2

Quantitative Methods
Quantitative risk assessment considers factual and measurable data that is based on

calculations. Quantitative risk assessment usually considers the impact of the incidents on
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economic loss and operational loss and calculates probability. It is more objective and has more
generalizability than qualitative risk assessment methods.
Cybersecurity investment or, in a broader sense, the economics of information security
has been studied for a long time. Cybersecurity has become a critical investment section, and it
has attracted the attention of many industry practitioners and scholars. Therefore, there have
been plenty of studies to determine the optimal amount for cybersecurity investment. Scholars
suggest different methods to help decision-makers on how much to invest in cybersecurity to
protect operational excellence and intellectual property. Certain significant studies focused on
cybersecurity investment are summarized below.
Scholars developed and implemented different optimization models on the economics of
cybersecurity using game theory, optimization theory, and security controls selection. One of the
earlier works (Gordon & Loeb, 2002) utilized optimization to calculate the optimal amount to
invest in cybersecurity. They claim that a small fractional amount (37%) of the expected damage
loss would be enough to invest in cybersecurity. Lam (2015) employs optimization with a
regulatory perspective rather than an enterprise-level analysis. He suggests that the vendor
should not burden the full liability of the compromise; instead, it should be shared between the
seller and the consumer.
Game theory and optimization are used to compare the two methods of benchmarking the
efficiency of cybersecurity investments (Cavusoglu, Raghunathan, & Yue, 2008; Fielder,
Panaousis, Malacaria, Hankin, & Smeraldi, 2016).
A Table Top Approach is taken to evaluate the impacts of cyber intrusion events and the
benefits of safeguards investments (Garvey, Moynihan, & Servi, 2013). The tabletop approach is
designed to “place light demands on the granularity of inputs” to analyze the impacts of cyber-
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attack events and the perks of cybersecurity investments. The authors merge the Multi-criteria
risk and decision-analytic approach and Pareto optimal economic return to estimate the
investment amount derived from the impact of cybersecurity incidents and merit points of
safeguards.
A risk management approach is suggested for assessing information security products
(Arora, Hall, Pinto, Ramsey, & Telang, 2004). They point out that security managers need to
consider the risk-based return on investment method to determine how much to invest in
cybersecurity due to higher uncertainties in the cyber domain.
A survey-based quantitative approach Information Security Risk Analysis Method
(ISRAM) is developed to analyze the security risks of information technologies (Karabacak &
Sogukpinar, 2005). The method has seven steps; awareness of the problem, listing and weighing
the factors, converting factors into questions and answers, preparation of risk tables, conduction
the survey, application of formula and obtaining a single risk value, and assessment of the
results. Also, ISRAM is appropriate to calculate the monetary value of cyber risk by using
annual loss expectancy (ALE).
Schneier (2008) considers security, not an investment but loss prevention. A company
should spend money only on the worth of the problem, not more than that. ALE calculates the
cost of a security event in both tangibles and intangibles. Then, it multiplies that by chance, the
event will occur in a year. He suggests doing not solely rely on Return on Investment (ROI) or
ALE analysis. That gives the amount to spend to mitigate the risk. Challenges for cybersecurity
ALE:
•

Lack of data on the incident

•

High uncertainty and rapid change in the cyber domain
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•

Extreme and rare events

A user-centered cloud computing risk analysis is explored (Rabai, Jouini, Aissa, & Mili,
2013). They propose a security metric that quantifies the cloud risk for providers and subscribers
in economic terms by using mean failure cost (MFC).
A group of scholars discuss the capability of insurance for cyber risk management
(Biener, Eling, & Wirfs, 2015). They work on 944 cases of cyber compromise from the
operational risk database and assess their statistical outputs. They underscore that cyber risk has
unique characteristics and problems due to a lack of available data and information asymmetries.
Bayesian Generalized Linear Models are developed by using the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse (PRC) dataset to study the patterns in data breaches (Edwards, Hofmeyr, &
Forrest, 2016). They claim that the size or frequency of data breaches has not increased.
However, they see that the heavy-tailed statistical distributions explain the increase. Also, they
state that the log-normal distributions better model the size of data breaches.
Cyber costs are identified from an operational risk database and assess these with
statistics and actuarial science methods (Eling & Wirfs, 2019). They use 1,579 cyber risk cases
from an operational risk dataset. They employ the peaks-over-threshold technique from extreme
value theory. Their models can be used to generate reliable risk evaluations based on country,
industry, size, and other factors.
Some researchers suggest employing ROI to calculate the optimal amount of information
security. Clifton (2015) recommends that the ROI determination should be relevant to the factors
associated with the risk of a cybersecurity incident. Several risk assessment organizations use the
Cyber Value-at-Risk concept adapted from finance (Sanna, 2016). Cyber VaR model provides a
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foundation for quantifying information risk and insert discipline into the quantification process.
Cyber VaR models apply probabilities to estimate likely losses from cyber-attacks during a given
time-frame. The goal of Cyber VaR modes is two-fold (Sanna, 2016):
•

Assist risk and InfoSec professionals to articulate cyber risk in monetary terms

•

Empower Chief level managers to make cost-effective decisions and balance between
securing the organization and running the business
VaR modeling is a statistical methodology employed to quantify the level of financial

risk within an organization or investment portfolio over a specific time frame. VaR is calculated
in three variables:

2.4

•

The amount of potential loss

•

The probability of that amount of loss

•

The time-frame

Monetary Impact of Data Breach on Companies
This section will introduce the definition of personally identifiable information, sensitive

personally identifiable information, the monetary impact of massive data breaches, summary of
literature review, and existing data breach cost models.
Definition of PII and Sensitive PII
The data will be categorized and used in the model is as set forth by the definition of the
Department of Homeland Security PII and sensitive PII (SPII). Government or private
organizations collect, store, or transfer the data of people’s name, address, social security
number, driver’s license number, mother’s maiden name, usernames and passwords, and
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credit/debit card and so on. The loss or theft of SPII can result in embarrassment, inconvenience,
reputational harm, emotional harm, financial loss, unfairness, and personal safety in danger.
DHS (2017) defines personal information as “Personally Identifiable Information” which means
that “any information that permits the identity of an individual to be directly or indirectly
inferred, including any other information that is linked or linkable to that individual, regardless
of whether the individual is a US citizen, legal permanent resident, a visitor to the US, or
employee or contractor to the Department."
Sensitive PII is “personally identifiable information which, if lost, compromised or
disclosed without authorization, could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience
or unfairness to an individual (DHS, 2017)."
Examples of PII and SPII are provided below (DHS, 2017; STIP, 2018; WDPI, n.d.):
Table 1. Examples of PII
PII
Name
Account name/ user ID
Password
Email
Address
Telephone number
Education credentials/certificates
Date/place of birth
Vehicle title number
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Table 2. Examples of SPII
SPII
Social security numbers
Medical history
Credit/ debit card numbers
Driver’s license numbers
Bank account numbers
Passport numbers
Alien registration numbers
Biometric identifiers
Taxpayer identification number

Also, certain information in-combined may pose more threat than standalone. For
example, name, zip code, and credit card information may be more sensitive when combined
than apart. The most recent data breaches provide more details on the number and type of stolen
data. Table 3 provides the details of the Equifax data breach (Owens, 2018).
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Table 3. Aftermath of Equifax Data Breach
Stolen data type

Number of records

Name

147 million

Date of birth

147 million

Social security number

146 million

Address

99 million

Gender

27 million

Phone number

20 million

Driver’s license number

18 million

Email address

2 million

Credit card number

209,000

Tax ID

97,500

Driver’s license state

27,000

Data Breach
A data breach is a cybersecurity incident that causes intentional or unintentional
disclosure of data. Exposed data may include personal health information, personally identifiable
information, blueprints, intellectual property, or state secrets. The finance industry is one of the
primary targets of malicious actors because malicious actors can get credit card numbers,
account numbers, or social security numbers (Ponemon, 2019). Since those data are stored in the
cyber domain, maintaining the security of data is a must for companies.
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Data breaches are the most common cyber incident based on his work on the Advisen
dataset (Romanosky, 2016). He found credit cards and medical information were the most stolen
data from organizations. As a result, those organizations are more likely to face litigation from
individuals.
Data breach risk is a significant concern for organizations that operate in the cyber
domain. Cyber systems are now crowded with criminals, hackers, government actors, hacktivists,
and other adversaries. Media attention to cybersecurity issues has grown dramatically over the
past several years as well. In 2013, about 40 million credit and debit cards were stolen from
Target’s point of sale terminals (Krebs, 2014). The following year, details on 56 million credit
cards were stolen from Home Depot in a similar attack. In February 2015, personal information
from about 80 million people was taken from the healthcare company Anthem (Krebs, 2015).
Equifax suffered a massive data breach that lost nearly 146 million customers’ SSN, passports,
or driver’s licenses (Johnson, 2018). These examples are massive data breaches. Therefore, the
cost may easily exceed $100M. However, on average, the loss per data breach that a
compromised company suffers between $2.1M and $3.8M (Eling & Schnell, 2016). Ponemon
Institute continuously conducts a study in the cost of data breaches. Its latest report states that the
average total cost of a data breach is $3.92M, and the cost per lost record is $150 (Ponemon,
2019).
Massive data breaches may cause catastrophic damages not only compromise of data but
also businesses shutdown resulting in unemployment, legal fees, loss of customer trust, loss of
revenue, or a decrease in stock price. However, it is hard to monetize poor public relations, loss
of future income, and the value of cyber-assets. We can easily find out the visible or direct costs,
such as credit monitoring, investigation, government fee, or litigation. Table 4 shows the victim
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organizations, the number of affected people, and how much money they had to spend after the
incident. Examples of the massive data breach and its consequences are provided in the table.

Table 4. Infamous Massive Data Breaches
Company/Organization

Number of Affected People

Total Cost

Sony PSN

77M

$193M

Target

40M

$310M

Yahoo

500M

$502M

Equifax

146M

$1,445M

Home Depot

56M

$340M

Uber

57M

$148M

Anthem

80M

$406M

2.4.1

Measuring the Impact of the Data Breach
There are very few practical studies that quantify the monetary value of data breaches.

Relevant literature is summarized below.
Romanosky (2016) employed the data collected by Advisen and developed a formula to
associate the factors with the monetary impact of a data breach. The mean loss for a data breach
is $5.7M. However, the median is $170K.
The data breach impact formula:
log (cost it)) = β0 + β1*log (revenue it) + β2 *log(records it) + β3 repeat it + β4 * malicious it + β5
*lawsuit it + α * FirmType it + λ t + ρ ind

+

µ it
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The explanation of the variables:
Cost: the total cost of the incident
Revenue: firm’s revenue
Records: the number of compromised records
Repeat: binary variable code; 1 if the firm suffered multiple events, and 0 otherwise.
Malicious: a binary variable; 1 if the event was caused by malicious intent
Lawsuit: is a binary variable code; 1 if a legal action resulted
FirmType: a vector of binary variables describing the firm was government agency, nonprofit,
private or publicly traded company
λ t: vectors of years
ρ ind : industry binary variable
µ it : error term supposed to be uncorrelated with the covariates
Romanosky (2016) states that a 10% increase in revenue would increase the cost by
1.3%. He also founds a strong correlation of the number of records compromised with the loss. A
10% increase in the number of records compromised would increase the cost by 2.9%. The R2 is
0.46.
Another model is developed by using the Ponemon Cost of Data Breach 2014. The author
tries a Linear Regression model but concludes that the linear model is inadequate and perform a
log-log regression (Jacobs, 2014):
R-Squared is 0.5, and the model is:
Log (impact) = 7.68 +0.76 * log (records)
In this model, he claims that a 10% increase in the lost number of records causes a 7.6% increase
in the cost of the data breach.
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Another scholar suggested a cybernomics concept to measure the cyber risk. However,
her primary intent is to quantify the cyber-assets into the monetary term. She suggests
employing MicroMort and VaR to quantify the risk and categorizes the cyber assets (Ruan,
2017).
•

Digitized assets

•

Assets born-digital

•

Operational assets

The total value of cyber assets can be calculated as:
'(

'/

𝑉 = # 𝐶𝑉𝑖 + # 𝑂𝑉𝑗
)*+

0*+

V: the total digital value of entity E
CV: the value of core asset c of entity E
OV: the value of the operational asset of O entity E
Nc: the number of core value assets in entity E
No: the number of operational assets in entity E

Another study is carried out to calculate the tangible costs of data breaches using two
case studies, focusing on a salary guide and ballpark estimation of the work hours of the people
who were involved in managing the data breach (Layton & Watters, 2014). They forecast labor
costs regarding them as the only tangible cost. Regarding intangible costs, Layton and Waters
only consider the loss of reputation. It is interesting to note that they argue that the stock price
was not negatively impacted after the announcement of a data breach in the two cases
considered.
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Kuypers (2017) developed a total cost of cyber incidents at an organization per year. He
runs a Monte Carlo simulation in which the data comes from historical events and scenarios. He
modeled different attack types, their frequencies, and their impacts. However, his model takes
privacy information loss as a variable in the equation. The total cost of each incident is gathered
by adding each impact category; investigation cost, direct costs, business interruption, reputation
damage, credit monitoring, and loss of intellectual property.
Factor analysis of information risk (FAIR) is a cyber risk assessment approach and
provides a well-reasoned and logical assessment framework (Freund & Jones, 2015). The main
focus is developing probabilities for frequency and magnitude of confidentiality, integrity, or
availability breach.
Ponemon Institute consistently conducts data breach surveys and publish the results as in
their reports. The report provides a sample from the populations and gives a perspective by
describing the facts such as the number of records exposed, total-average-per record data breach
cost. According to the latest Ponemon (2019) data breach report,
•

The average total cost of a data breach: $3.92 million

•

The average size of a data breach: 25,575 records

•

Cost per lost record: $150

•

The Healthcare industry has the highest average cost of a data breach: $6.45 million.

However, the report does not provide any model or prediction; instead, it only provides
descriptive statistics of the sample.
Related literature on the monetary impact of a data breach is tabulated and presented in
Table 5. The table is divided into seven sections: "Source" column indicates the article's
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reference; "Qualitative" and "Quantitative" columns indicate the approach; "Monetary Impact"
column indicates if the study covers the monetary aspect of the cyber risk; "Type of Cyber Risk"
column shows the type of cyber risk if it is overall or specific; "Data Classification" column
shows if the study classified the data; "Model/Method" column explains the proposed method.

Table 5. Summary of Literature Review
Source
(Gordon & Loeb,
2002)
(Arora et al., 2004)
(Karabacak &
Sogukpinar, 2005)
(Su et al., 2006)
(Jones, 2007)
(Schneier, 2008)
(Cavusoglu et al.,
2008)
(Zhang et al., 2010)
(Rabai et al., 2013)
(Garvey et al., 2013)
(Jacobs, 2014)
(Biener et al., 2015)
(Clifton, 2015)
(Lam, 2015)
(Freund & Jones,
2015)
(Romanosky, 2016)
(Fielder et al., 2016)
(Sanna, 2016)
(Kuypers, 2017)
(Edwards et al., 2016)
(Ruan, 2017)
(Eling & Loperfido,
2017)
(Eling & Wirfs, 2019)
(NetDiligence, 2018)
(Ponemon, 2019)

Qualitative

x

Quantitative

Cost

Type of
Cyber Risk

x

x

overall

Gordon-Loeb model

x

x

overall

RMF and ROI

x

x

overall

ALE

overall
overall
overall

Framework
Framework
ALE

overall

Game theory

cloud
cloud

x
x
x
x

x

x
x

x

overall

x
x
x

x
x
x

data breach
overall
overall
overall

x

x

overall

FAIR

x
x
x
x

x
x
x

data breach
Overall
overall
overall

x

x

data breach

x

x

overall

Multiple regression
Game theory
Cyber VaR
Statistical tests
Bayesian Generalized
Linear Model
Cybernomics/ MicroMort
and VaR

x
x

Model/Method

Framework
MFC
Multi-criteria risk and
decision analytics
Linear regression
Statistical tests
ROI
Optimization

x

x

Data
Classification

x
x

x
x
x

data breach

Statistical tests

overall
data breach
data breach

Actuarial models
Descriptive
Descriptive
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2.4.2

Impact on Stock-prices
The impact of cybersecurity incidents on public companies has been a point of interest

for scholars for a long time. Most of the researchers find out that cybersecurity incidents have
temporary negative impacts on stock prices. However, it is hard to reach a robust conclusion due
to a lack of the number of incidents, categorization per industry, and elimination of factors other
than cybersecurity incidents. Nevertheless, the studies are shown in the table below state that
data breaches have a negative impact on stock prices. Also, SEC may issue fines to the public
companies that fail to comply with the data security regulations and fail to notify the customers.
The impact of cybersecurity incidents on stock prices may increase in time as it appears
more in mass media, and governments issue higher fees than before. The Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) enforces public companies to reveal the cost of a data breach. However, SEC
compels the public companies since 2018. Before 2018, companies were not supposed to share
the total cost in their yearly reports. A literature review of the impact of data breaches on stock
prices is illustrated below in Table 6. The table shows the number of events, timeframe, and
event windows.

Table 6. Impact of Data Breaches on Stock-prices
Author

number of events

sample period

Event windows

(K. Campbell, Gordon,
Loeb, & Zhou, 2003)
(Ko & Dorantes, 2006)

43

1995-2000

[-1,1]

19

1997-2003

subsequent four quarters

(Goel & Shawky, 2009)

168

2004-2008

[-2,1]

(Bolster, Pantalone, &
Trahan, 2010)

93

2000-2007

[-1,0] [-1,1] [1,30]

29

2.5

(Gatzlaff &
McCullough, 2010)
(Yayla & Hu, 2011)

77

2004-2006

[0,1] [0,35]

123

1994-2006

[-1,1] [-1,5] [-1,10]

(Modi, Wiles, & Mishra,
2015)
(Hinz, Nofer, Schiereck,
& Trillig, 2015)
(Schatz & Bashroush,
2016)
(Poyraz, Serttas, Keskin,
Tatar, & Pinto, 2018)

146

2005-2010

[-2,2]

6

2011-2012

[0,1] [0,2] ,[0,3]

50

2005-2013

[-121,-3], [-2,2]
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2006-2018

[-7, -3, -1,0,1,3,7]

Cyber-cost Taxonomy
Several studies shed light on the types of costs incurred after cyber-attacks and data

breaches. Cyber-cost has two categories that are direct and indirect costs. The cyber-cost
taxonomy is summarized in table 7 (Kopp, Kaffenberger, & Wilson, 2017; Kuypers, 2017;
NetDiligence, 2018; Ponemon, 2019; Romanosky, 2016).

Table 7. Cyber-cost Taxonomy
Phase
Prevention (continuous)

Direct Costs
• Safeguards
• Regulatory compliance cost

Indirect Costs
Opportunity cost

Reaction (immediate)

• Technical investigation
• Stop intrusion and initiate the
recovery of systems

•
•
•
•

Cost of operational disruption
Opportunity costs
Loss in revenue
Loss in equity value

Impact management (short-term)

• Adjustment to infrastructure and
processes
• System and data recovery
• Damage reduction
• Post-breach customer protection
• Initiation of cyber audit
• Attorney and litigation cost
• Credit monitoring
• Class action lawsuits

•
•
•
•

Opportunity costs
Loss in revenue
Loss in equity value
Customer loss

Business recovery and remediation
(medium to long term)

• Increased funding costs
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• Fees
• Penalties
• Discounts for future products
and services

2.6

• Lower future demand for
breached firm’s services
• Redesign of business processes
and systems
• Rebuilding relationships,
reputation and brand value
• Investment in better security
systems and preparedness
capabilities

Data Protection Frameworks, Regulations, and Guidelines
State and federal governments have been working on improving the data breach

legislation in favor of citizens. Companies must notify the customers within the given time-frame
and take steps to reduce the impact of the breach (DWT, 2018). There are specific regulations
and frameworks for industries to follow the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
2.6.1

Federal Trade Commission Data Breach Guide
FTC is one of the major government organizations that monitor data breach or privacy

rights violations. It is authorized to issue fines and enforce companies to follow specific
procedures. FTC recommends five fundamental principles to have a robust data security plan
(FTC, 2016):
1. Take stock: know what personal information is held have in inventory.
a. Check who sends sensitive information
b. Check how personal information is received
c. What kind of information is collected
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d. Where the information is kept
2. Scale down: keeping only what is required, do not collect the sensitive information that is
not needed
3. Lock it: protect the information that is kept
a. Ensure physical security
b. Ensure electronic security
c. Ensure cybersecurity
d. Conduct continuous cyber risk assessments
e. Employee training
f. Monitor third-party risks
4. Pitch it: properly dispose of what is no longer needed
5. Plan ahead: create a plan to respond to security incidents
2.6.2

Securities and Exchange Commission Guidance on Cybersecurity
SEC issued about the cybersecurity incident disclosure of public companies. The

statement adds two rules to its previous guidance in 2011 that are (SEC, 2018):
•

establishing and maintaining appropriate and effective disclosure controls and procedures

•

prohibiting company personnel from insider trading before appropriate disclosure of
cybersecurity incidents

Disclosures should include:
•

Frequency of cyber events, based on experience

•

Probability and magnitude of incidents (costs, in financial terms)

•

Adequacy of controls
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•

Third-party suppliers’ risk

•

Amount of insurance coverage

•

Potential reputational harm

•

Relevant laws and regulations

•

Potential fines and judgments from cybersecurity incidents
Cybersecurity controls and procedures should identify cybersecurity risks, incidents,

impacts on business. Also, there should be a shared understanding between technical experts and
disclosure advisors to provide timely disclosures of risks that may not yet have been the target of
a cyber-attack and incidents.
Nevertheless, SEC does not recommend making detailed disclosures of the cybersecurity
incidents or system features to prevent malicious actors from penetrating the organizations’
security. The guidance aims to protect investors’ interest by keeping them knowledgeable about
the companies that investors put money.
Because cybersecurity incidents yield monetary loss such as investigation, breach
notification, or loss of revenue, these financial impacts should be incorporated into companies’
financial statements.
A failure to appropriately disclose the cybersecurity incidents may yield more financial
damage to companies. For example, Yahoo was fined $35 million by SEC for under-reporting its
cybersecurity incidents (Michaels, 2018).
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2.6.3

General Data Protection Regulation
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been issued by the European Union

(EU) in 2016 and has been active since 2018. The goal of the GDPR is to ensure the privacy of
all EU citizens. All companies operating in EU borders are subject to GDPR regardless of the
company’s location. Therefore, GDPR applies to companies that are not located in the EU, too.
Failure to complying with GDPR can be fined up to 4% of annual global turnover or €20 million
(whichever is greater). All member states are required to notify data breaches where a data
breach can “result in a risk for the rights and freedom of individuals.” Data breach notification
must be done within 72 hours of first having become aware of the breach. Critical items of
GDPR:
•

Consent be freely given

•

New individual rights given to data subjects

•

Data protection impact assessments for large scale processing

•

Notifying within in 72 hours of the data breach

•

Appointment of Data Protection Officers to manage privacy framework

•

Considering privacy in developing business processes and new systems

•

Accountability for personal data

There are two different types of data-handlers the GDPR applies to: “processors” and
“controller.” Whereas a controller is a “person, public authority or another body which
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data,” a processor is a “person,
public authority, agency or another body which processes personal data on behalf of the
controller.” Both processors and controllers are obliged to comply with GDPR.
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So far, the largest GDPR fine issued is €50 million to Google that the company was not
following GDPR (Palmer, 2019). British Airways parent company is faced with paying $230
million due to last year's data breach (Wall & Olson, 2019). Nevertheless, the fine has not been
finalized.
2.6.4

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Privacy Rule
The HIPAA enforce security provisions and data privacy to protect patients’ medical

records. HIPAA Privacy Rule is established to protect patients’ “individually identifiable health
information.” The requirement for notifying individuals of a data breach of their information is
active since 2009 with the Breach Notification Rule. Examples of individually identifiable health
information (OCR, 2003):
•

Past, present, future physical or mental health or condition of individuals

•

Provision of healthcare to the individual

•

Payment information of individuals

The HIPAA Privacy Rule has two primary purposes:
•

Defining limitations on the allowable uses and disclosures of protected health
information, instructing when, with whom, and under what conditions, health
information could be shared.

•

Giving patients access to their health data on demand.
The goal of the HIPAA Security Rule is to provide electronic health data that is

appropriately secured, and accessibility to electronic health data is controlled. The final goal is
the auditable trail of personal health information activity is maintained. HIPAA violations can
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cause severe costs for a healthcare organization. In addition to the investigation, remediation, and
notification costs, the Office of Civil Rights may also fine the organization.

2.7

Limitations
The study of the monetary impact of a data breach is very recent; as a result, there is a

certain lack of methodology and data to develop further models to predict the monetary impact.
The limitations are listed below:
•

Lack of available datasets that categorizes the information as PII and SPII

•

Lack of available data to estimate the total cost of a data breach

•

The non-random structure of missing data prohibits the development of an unbiased set
of regression models either from using only full data cases or estimating missing data
(Little & Rubin, 2002). The dataset is developed based on the availability of information
about the variables. Therefore, random sampling is not applied. The details of the data
collection will be explained in the next chapter.

•

The risk preference, i.e., vNM utility theory of risk, is not considered in this study

•

This study will only focus on massive data breaches in which the amount of stolen data is
in millions of affected people

•

Majority of the companies in the dataset are public companies due to the data availability

2.8 Knowledge Gap
Cyber-risk, cybersecurity investment, or impact of cyber-attacks on firms have been well
studied. There have been plenty of studies that propose qualitative or quantitative cyber risk
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assessment methods or cybersecurity investment models. However, in recent years, state and
federal governments have developed rules, regulations, and laws to strictly enforce organizations
to take measurements against PII data breaches to protect the privacy rights of citizens. These
government agencies have been issuing fees to any company that fails to protect PII by imposing
high penalties. In addition to that costs, there are also indirect costs, such as customer
notifications, credit monitoring, and class action lawsuit. As a result, a massive data breach that
includes PII or SPII may yield financial consequences that can jeopardize the profit of the
companies. However, there is very little empirical research that focuses on the monetary impact
of PII or SPII data breaches.
A few studies consider the monetary impact of data breaches, but the criticality of the
information or classification of the information has not been studied. Also, current datasets
regard the incidents in terms of affected people, not the number of stolen data or the sensitivity
of the data. SEC (2018) compels public companies to disclose their loss due to cyber-attack and
adequately report the cybersecurity incidents and material cyber risk in their reports. However,
only the data breaches that occurred after SEC's update in cybersecurity reporting have more
detail in about the impact of data breaches.
As mentioned by many scholars that data breach incidents are not normally distributed
(Eling & Loperfido, 2017; Wheatley, Hofmann, & Sornette, 2019). The distribution is heavytailed. The difference between the median and mean of data breach cost is wide (Ponemon,
2019). Also, current models consider the only number of affected people or the number of
records disregarding the type of information. As a result, those models have very low accuracy in
guessing the impact of a new data breach. Therefore, data breach cost models need segmentation
to estimate the cost, such as cases where the number of affected people is between:
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•

1-100,000

•

100,000 – 1,000,000

•

1,000,000 and more
A study is required to identify the relevant independent variables and develop a new data

breach dataset that will help develop predictive models using different algorithms.
The outcome of the study will contribute to the impact of data breach risk assessment.
This study will introduce new variables that calculate the monetary cost of a massive data
breach. Statistical tests will be employed, which will provide the validity and generalizability of
the model.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction
The nature of a research problem defines the methodology to be used. The unique
methodology for this research adopts an empirical approach to statistically test the existence of a
relationship of a variable (cost of PII data breach) among other variables. The main focus of this
research is to develop a regression model that predicts the cost of PII data breach and how the
independent variables are related to the dependent variable. The problem requires the availability
of the data for the type of data compromised, total cost due to a data breach, lawsuits, and
revenue. Although there are datasets that give an idea about the size of the breach such as
Advisen, Privacy Right Clearinghouse, Ponemon reports, or Identity Theft Resource Center, they
do not categorize the stolen information per type. Also, only Advisen among those has
information about the victim company, such as revenue, cost of the breach, or lawsuits.
Moreover, datasets regarding cybersecurity incidents, either financial or technical
datasets, have not reached a consensus on what data needs to be collected, how to categorize it,
and to what extent it should be available to the public. Therefore, there is not a complete dataset
to observe the total impact of a cybersecurity incident, either financial or technical, yet. Another
problem with the datasets is the subjectivity of the data collected. The datasets have been formed
based on the interviews, surveys, or yearly reports of organizations. Therefore, it is not entirely
objective or correct. However, they are good enough to shed light on the consequences of
cybersecurity incidents.
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This chapter covers the overall research methodology, research questions, methods,
datasets, and validity of the research. The rationale of the research methodology is also discussed
in this chapter.

3.2 Type of Reasoning in Research
In general, researchers adopt a research methodology to develop an argument. The
research methodology depends on the nature of the problem. In this section, the definition of
inductive, deductive, and abductive reasoning will be provided.
3.2.1

Inductive Reasoning
Kerlinger (1986) defined theory as "A set of interrelated constructs, definitions, and

propositions that presents a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations between
variables, to explain natural phenomena."
Researchers widely employ inductive research because it provides to identify a new
theory, a broad explanation for behaviors, patterns, or attitudes. Inductive reasoning enables
developing from the data to broad perspectives to a generalized model. The approach is applied
where the hypotheses do not help to develop a generalized model or a theory.
Inductive reasoning brings out theories towards the end of the research process after
observations are carried out (Goddard & Melville, 2004). Inductive approach "involves the
search for a pattern from observation and the development of explanations – theories – for those
patterns through a series of hypotheses" (Bernard, 2006). A researcher may have no theory at the
beginning of the study, yet, theories may evolve as a result of the research.
Inductive reasoning is also referred to as a bottom-up approach where a researcher uses
observations to develop an abstraction or to define an image of the phenomenon which is already
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studied (Lodico, Spaulding, & Voegtle, 2010). "Inductive approach aims to generate meanings
from the data set collected to identify patterns and relationships to build a theory; however, the
inductive approach does not prevent the researcher from using existing theory to formulate the
research question to be explored." (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012).
The typical steps of the inductive approach are explained below (Creswell, 2009):
1. The researcher gathers information (interviews, observations)
2. The researcher asks open-ended questions of participants or record field notes
3. The researcher analyzes data to form themes or categories
4. The researcher looks for broad patterns, generalizations, or theories from themes or
categories
5. The Researcher pose generalizations or theories from past experiences and literature
3.2.2

Deductive Reasoning
Another approach that is widely used by scholars is the deductive approach or deductive

reasoning. A deductive argument runs from a general statement to conclusions about the
specifics. A generalized model or a theory is generated through; stipulation of a theory or
hypotheses, justification of that theory, or hypotheses on specific observations. Unlike inductive
reasoning, the theory is placed toward the beginning of the proposal for a study. The objective
here is to test or verify the theory. A researcher develops a theory, gathers data to test it, and
contemplate on its confirmation or disconfirmation by the results (Creswell, 2009). The
researcher tests or verifies a theory by examining hypotheses or questions generated from it.
Typical steps of deductive reasoning are given below (Creswell, 2009):
The researcher:
1. tests or verifies a theory
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2. tests hypotheses or research questions from the theory
3. defines and operationalizes variables derived from the theory
4. measures or observes variables using an instrument to obtain scores
3.2.3

Abductive Reasoning
Abductive reasoning is a type of logical inference form termed by Charles Sanders

Peirce in the 19th century. Abductive reasoning differs both inductive and deductive reasoning.
Deductive reasoning starts with a rule, proceeds from there to a specific solution that either
shows the acceptability of the assertion or falsifies it (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014). Example
for deduction:
•

All X is Z

•

Y is X

•

Thus, Y is Z
On the other hand, induction starts with observations that are limited and specific in

scope and moves to a generalized conclusion that is not certain (Butte.edu, 2013). Example of
induction (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014):
•

All observed swans are white

•

Thus, all swans are white
On the other hand, abductive reasoning begins with an observation or set of observations

and then proceeds to generate the most straightforward and most likely conclusion from the
experiences. Abduction is an inference to the best explanation (Douven, 2017). Example for
abduction (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014):
•

The surprising fact C is observed
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•

But if A were true, C would be a matter

•

Hence, there is a reason to suspect that A is true

3.3 Research Design and Methodology
Based on the characteristics of the research problem, the choice of statistical tests as a
primary research method can vary. Since the proposed model will be a follow-up study of
Romanosky (2016), and due to the small sample size, multiple regression methods will be proper
to apply.
The details of the methodology of this research are given in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Research Methodology

The methodology of the proposed research is as follows:
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Phase I
•

Literature Review: This sub-phase includes a literature review to show existing studies
and methods which are pertinent to the research problem of the research proposes.

•

Data Collection: This sub-phase provides a review of case studies PII data breaches,
comparison of datasets such as Advisen, PRC, Ponemon, news, media outlets, or yearly
reports of victim organizations

Phase II
•

Data refinement and analysis: This sub-phase organizes and refines the data collected
from the resources.

•

Determine the independent variables: This sub-phase includes the categorization of the
type of data stolen according to criticality and determine independent variables.

Phase III
•

Perform exploratory data analysis: analysis of the dataset, visualization of the variables.

•

Develop regression models: During this sub-phase, regression analysis will be completed
for each independent variable. After ensuring multiple regression analysis assumptions,
hypotheses for multiple regression analysis will be developed.

•

Apply and pick the best model: This sub-phase includes data analysis by using the
statistical report outputs such as R2, adjusted R2, predicted R2, and T-statistic, p-value,
Mallow Cp, and F-test scores. Thus, it will help determine the proposed predictors
explain the response variable.

Phase IV
•

Analyze, interpret, and compare the result: In this sub-phase, a detailed analysis of the
regression analysis will be executed. The outputs that will be interested are R2, predicted
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R2, adjusted R2, Mallow Cp, T-statistic, p-value, and F-test score; in this sub-phase
previous models and proposed model will be compared.
•

Validation: This sub-phase includes the validation of the model by capitalizing on the
statistical significance and generalizability of the model.

Phase V
•

Publish the findings: This phase will be close out of the research, and conclusions of the
research will be reported with the various deliverables.

3.4 Model Development
Measuring impacts of cybersecurity incidents has been a significant challenge. The
proposed research will categorize the data according to criticality, which is elucidated by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2017).
Companies tend to under-report cybersecurity events to evade fees or loss of reputation
(Ferran, 2016; IT-Online, 2016). As a result, organizations keep records of their cyber incident
data in-house. However, this may not be the situation all the time. For example, depending on the
scope of incidents, some of these incidents may have to become public.
There are not many sources that collect and organize data breach incidents through
surveying companies. The available datasets will be explained in the following section.
3.4.1 Data Collection
There are cybersecurity incidents datasets as Advisen, PRC, and ITRC. Each of these
dataset sources will be briefly described. Furthermore, this study will elaborate on why the
datasets stand-alone is not adequate to use the data in the proposed model. These datasets are
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essential for the proposed model because each dataset will contribute to the development of the
new dataset, which will be used to determine the variables of the proposed model. Besides, case
studies, news websites, quarterly, or yearly reports of organizations will be used to develop the
new dataset. Typically, the categorization of the data is based on the number of affected people
and the type of stolen information.
The goal of the proposed research is to introduce a categorization that is based on the
criticality of the stolen data.

Advisen
This database is developed and sold by Advisen Ltd, which is a leading data provider for
the commercial property and casualty insurance market. The dataset is more comprehensive than
the other available data breach datasets. It includes more than 40,000 cyber incidents. It includes
(Advisen, 2019):
•

Case information (type, legal status, accident date)

•

Number of affected people

•

Type and amount of monetary loss

•

Victim company (revenue, number of employees, industry code, geography)

•

Actor
Although Advisen cyber loss dataset is one of the most comprehensive datasets, it does

not regard the type of records. This means that the Advisen dataset only considers the number of
affected people. Therefore, the dataset alone is not suitable to use in the proposed model.
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Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC)
PRC data breach dataset is a publicly free dataset that includes the data breaches from
2005 to 2019 that consists of 9,000 incidents. It provides the following information:
•

Date

•

Company (name, location, type of organization)

•

Number of affected people
Unlike Advisen, the PRC dataset does not mention about the total cost of the data breach

or revenue of the company or legal status of the case. Besides, it does not categorize the
criticality of information and only considers the number of people (PRC, 2019).

Identity Theft Resource Center
ITRC has been recording publicly available disclosures of data breaches since 2005. The
types of data they track are; social security number, credit/debit number, email-password-user
name, protected health information, driver's license numbers, and financial accounts. ITRC
categorizes the data as sensitive and non-sensitive. The ITRC dataset includes the information of
victim company, date of the breach, records. However, it does not mention about the cost the
data breach caused but only calculates the total breached records (ITRC, 2019).
3.4.2 Multiple Regression Definition
Correlations are complex computations that measure the degree of association between
two or more variables, using exact scores instead of rough categories. The calculation produces a
single number called a correlation coefficient, which summarizes the relationship.
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Linear regression is a statistical procedure used to estimate the amount of change in a
dependent variable that can be expected for a given change in an independent variable. Simple
regression involves one dependent variable and one independent variable. A linear equation of a
regression model can be shown as follows:
Y = α + βX
The α is the value of Y when X equals zero. It is also called Y-intercept.
The β is referred to as the regression coefficient. It is also known as the slope of the
regression line. The β gives the number of units change in Y that can be expected for a one-unit
change in X.
It is essential to distinguish between the actual Y values that do not fall on the regression
line and the corresponding estimated E(Y) values that we would estimate based on a given
respondent's X value. The discrepancy between the actual Y value and E(Y) value represents the
prediction error. When the Y values tend to cluster very close to the regression line, E(Y) and Y
values will be very similar, and the error in prediction will be small. However, when the Y
values tend to deviate markedly from the regression line, the Y and E(Y) values will be quite
different, the error in prediction will be high.
Multiple regression
Multiple regression is a frequently used statistical method for analyzing data when there
are more than one independent variable and one dependent variable. Independent variables are
also called predictors, and the dependent variable can be called criterion, outcome, or response
variable.
Multiple regression is an extension of simple regression. A general multiple regression
formula can be defined with the following linear equation:
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Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + …+ βnXn
The coefficients βn values in multiple regression equations are referred to as partialregression coefficients. These coefficients represent the degree of change in the dependent
variable that we would estimate for a one-unit change in the specified predictor.
The multiple correlation coefficient (R) is used to summarize the accuracy of our
prediction equation. The difference between Y and E(Y) stands for the error in the prediction. If
we have selected a set of predictors that yield accurate estimates of Y, then the difference
between Y and E(Y) values will be small, and multiple correlations will be high. If, however,
we have selected a set of predictors that yields poor estimates of Y, then the difference between
E(Y) and Y values would be larger, and the multiple correlations would be small.
R is the correlation of the combination of the independent variables with the dependent
variable. The R tells the strength of the correlation exists between the predictor variables and the
criterion variable. The goal is to find a linear combination of independent variables that explains
the most variance in the dependent variable. Multiple regression is used to predict or explain the
relationship between the linear combination of the independent variables and the dependent
variables. As with correlation, even a high R does not mean that the independent variables
caused the change in the dependent variable.
The R2 gives the proportion of the variance in the response variable, which is accounted
for by the predictors in the regression. If R = 0.9 then R2 = 0.81; it determines that the
independent variables are considered account 81% of the variance in the response variable.
Conditions and assumptions of multiple regression
The assumptions to employ multiple regression include the follow (Gliner, Morgan, &
Leech, 2017; Statistics Solutions, n.d.):
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•

The relationship between each of the predictor variables and the dependent variable is
linear

•

The error or residual is normally distributed and uncorrelated with the predictors

•

There should be no high correlations between independent variables. In the case of
multicollinearity, two or more predictors are highly correlated. Variance Inflation Factor
or a Correlation matrix can be applied to see if there is multicollinearity between
independent variables

•

The dependent variable should be approximately normally distributed.

The validity of the model
The value of R2 means how well the prediction fits the data. R2 can be used in F statistics
to determine the data provide sufficient evidence about how the overall model contributes
information to predict the response variable. The value of R2 will increase as more variables are
included in the model. R2 can be forced to approach to one ‘1’ though the model provides no
information for the prediction of Y.
Unlike R2, adjusted R2 considers both the sample size and the number of b parameters in
the model. Adjusted R2 will always be smaller than R2, and, cannot be one by adding more
independent variables to the model. Some researchers prefer adjusted R2 while choosing a
measure of model adequacy.
However, what both R2 and adjusted R2 provide are useful, considering only their result
is not enough to claim that the model helps predict. Predicted R2 is calculated to define how well
a regression model makes a prediction. It is helpful to determine whether there is an overfitting
in the model. If there is a substantial difference between adjusted and predicted R2, that means
the model has overfitting. Predicted R2 is calculated by (Minitab, 2013):
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•

excluding a data point from the dataset

•

computing the regression equation

•

calculating how well the model estimates the removed observation

•

repeating this for each data points

•

and calculating aggregated R2
Applying T-tests on each b parameter can provide a better idea about the adequacy of the

model. Also, the F-test can be used to make inferences about the overall adequacy of the multiple
regression model. Another method can be Mallows' Cp, Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC),
and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) test to find the best model among subset models.
Checking the utility of a multiple regression model
1. Conduct a test of overall model adequacy using the F test that is
H0: b1=b2=b3=b4= 0
HA: At least one bi < > 0
If the model seems adequate to go to step 2
2. Conduct T-tests on those b parameters that are of interest (most important b). Number of
b should be limited to avoid type I error
3. Examine the values of adjusted R2 and predicted R2
4. Examine the p-values of the variables
5. Compare each model's:
a.

the Cp values

b. Akaike's Information Criterion
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c. Bayesian Information Criterion
d. PRESS (Prediction error sum of squares)
3.4.3 Model Development
In this dissertation, an incident-driven model is used to assess data breaches to predict
monetary impact. Current datasets supply the data breach in terms of the number of records
stolen, which only focuses on the number of people affected. Due to the lack of available
datasets, we will employ the data collected from yearly reports of organizations, case studies,
and other datasets like PRC, Ponemon, websites, and news. This study will only focus on the
impact leg of risk assessment.
The dataset will include the variables as follows:
•

The total cost of the data breach

•

Revenue of the organization

•

Total number of data stolen in PII category

•

Total number of data stolen in SPII category

•

Class-action lawsuits
Once the data are obtained, they need to be analyzed in a way that enables the calculation

of the monetary impact of the loss of records. So far, there are only two statistical models that
predict the monetary impact of cybersecurity incidents, which were covered above (Jacobs,
2014; Romanosky, 2016).
The right model for this study will be multiple regression analysis to predict the PII data
breach cost because of:
•

the continuity of earlier studies (Jacobs, 2014; Romanosky, 2016)
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•

small sample size

•

measuring the association between dependent and independent variables

Since multiple regression estimates the correlation between dependent and independent
variables, we cannot infer that there is a cause-effect relation. The variables are shown in the
table below.

Table 8. Description of the Variables
Variable

Type

Denotation

Definition

Total Cost

Dependent
variable

Y

The estimated cost of a data breach

Revenue

Independent
variable

X1

Yearly revenue of the company at $

High critical
data

Independent
variable

X2

Total number of SPII (e.g., SSN, credit card numbers) in numbers

Low critical
data

Independent
variable

X3

Total number of PII (e.g., name, address) in numbers

Class-action
lawsuit

Independent
variable

X4

Binary variable (1 or 0; 1 means if there is a lawsuit)

Hypothesis
•

The independent variable X1 relates to the dependent variable (Total cost)

•

The independent variable X2 relates to the dependent variable

•

The independent variable X3 relate to the dependent variable

•

The independent variable X4 relate to the dependent variable
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After identifying the dependent and independent variables, Multiple Regression
assumptions will be checked, which are:
1. The linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables: to check this
condition, scatterplots will be used, or simple regression will be done for each
independent variable.
2. Residuals are normally distributed: the errors between observed and estimated values are
normally distributed. It can be checked with a histogram.
3. No multicollinearity: no high correlation among independent variables. This can be
checked via a correlation matrix or the Variation Inflation Factor (VIF). Low VIF values
are desirable. If there is multicollinearity in the data, one of the independent variables can
be taken out of the equation.
4. Homoscedasticity: one way to check homoscedasticity is by creating a scatterplot of
residuals versus predicted values. We look for that there is no clear pattern in the
distribution to satisfy homoscedasticity.
E(Y) = β0 + β1X1 + β2 X2 + β3X3 + β4X4
E(Y): Expected total cost of PII data breach in $
βn: partial correlation coefficient per each independent variable
β0: constant where X equals to zero
X1: Revenue, in $
X2: High critical data were stolen: Combined data of PII (e.g., SSN and name) in number
X3: Low critical data were stolen: PII (e.g., name, address) in numbers
X4: Binary variable (1 or 0; 1 means if there is a lawsuit)
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Backward Elimination
Initially, the backward elimination method will be applied to find the best model that
explains the total cost of a data breach. The backward stepwise selection offers an efficient way
to identify the statistically non-significant variables. The first model includes all independent
variables. In each run, a statistically non-significant independent variable is removed. The
backward selection method requires that the number of sample size is larger than the number of
independent variables.
The output will give the results of R2, predicted R2, adjusted R2, p-value, PRESS statistic,
T-tests score, F-test, AIC, and BIC. Predicted R2, and adjusted R2 alone is not enough to claim
the overall adequacy of the predicting model. Therefore, we need to look at Cook's D, AIC, BIC,
Cp.
Statistical Software
The data is deployed in Python 3 environment. Python is a programming language that
allows researchers to work more quickly and more effectively. It provides an environment for
web development, data science, or scripting. It has a very rich library for data science such as
Pandas, NumPy, StatsModels, and Scikit-learn. A multiple regression analysis will be held using
data science libraries in the Python environment. Since Python libraries do not have predicted R2
and PRESS statistic calculations, they will be calculated in Minitab.
T-test:
A T-test is an inferential statistic utilized to find if there is a significant difference
between the means of two groups. It is used to test hypotheses that allow testing of an
assumption applicable to a population.
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A T-test looks at the t-statistic, t-distribution, and the degrees of freedom to find the
probability of difference between two sets of data. Our α value will be 0.05. Then, we will define
the t-critical value from looking at the T-table. According to our T-statistic, we will interpret that
our results are statistically significant, and there is a pattern. Our null hypothesis will be that
there is no correlation between the independent and dependent variables. An alternative
explanation will be that there is a linear relationship between independent and response
variables.
H0 : β = 0
HA: β>0 or β<0
Figure 3 illustrates an example of two-tailed t-distribution. Our expected t-statistic should
be in the blue area, which states that there is a linear correlation between response and predictor
variables. If our t-statistic occurs in the white area, then we must accept the null hypothesis,
which states that there is no correlation between the independent and dependent variables.

Figure 3. Example of Two-tailed t- distribution
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F statistic: is the ratio of among estimate of variance and the within the estimate of variance. The
output will give us F-statistic. We will determine α value as 0.05. Therefore, we will expect our
F-the statistic will be higher than F-critical value depending on the sample size. If so, then our
hypothesis will be correct, which is there is a correlation between independent and dependent
variables, and the results are statistically significant.
Mallows' Cp Criterion
Mallows' Cp is developed by Colin Mallows to evaluate the fit of a regression model,
which is estimated using ordinary least squares. It compares the predictive ability of subset
models to that of the full model. Mallows' Cp-statistics assess the size of the bias that is
introduced into the predicted responses by having an underspecified model (N/A, 2018). A small
value of Cp where Cp is near p tells that the model is more precise.
Cp = RSSp/s2 – (n-2p)
RSS= residual sum of squares
p= number of parameters including β0 (intercept)
s2= residual mean square from the largest equation

Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)
AIC compares the quality of a set of regression models to each other. Alone AIC number
does not mean anything about the model. It compares each model and assigns them a value. It
provides the best model out of a set of models. The best model has the lowest AIC value among
the subset models (James, Witten, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2017). The formula is:
AIC= -2(log-likelihood) +2p
P= number of parameters including β0 (intercept)
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Log-likelihood = measure of model fit. A higher number of log-likelihood means a better fit
If the sample size is small, n/K < ≈ 40, then use the following AIC formula:
AICc = -2(log-likelihood) +2K + (2K(K+1)/(n-K-1))
N= sample size
K= number of model parameters
Log-likelihood = measure of model fit
Bayesian Information Criterion
BIC is developed from a Bayesian perspective. The BIC tends to take on a small value for
a model with a low-test error, therefore, select the model that has the lowest BIC value like AIC
and Cp to determine the best model (James et al., 2017).
BIC= -2*(log-likelihood) + k*log(N)
K= number of parameters
N=sample size
Predicted Residual Error Sum of Squares (PRESS)
PRESS statistics is a cross-validation technique to provide how a model fits the data in
regression. It is calculated similarly to Predicted R2. In this one, we compute the sums of the
squares of the prediction residuals for the removed data points. The lowest value of PRESS
statistic can be interpreted as the best model that fits the data in the same dataset (Minitab, 2019).
Skewness
Skewness tells about how symmetrical the residual distribution is. The skewness of a
normal distribution is equal to zero. Negative values show that the data is skewed left, and
positive skew values indicate that the data is skewed right. If the data is left-skewed, the data is
concentrated on the left side of the distribution rather than in the middle. If the data is right-
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skewed, vice versa. As a rule of thumb, if the skewness is between -0.5 and 0.5, the distribution
of the data is reasonably symmetrical (McNeese, 2016).
Kurtosis
Kurtosis does not tell about the shape of the peak; instead, it is the interpretation of tail
extremity (Westfall, 2014). It is "a measure of the combined weight of the tails relative to the rest
of the distribution." (Wheeler, 2011). Therefore, kurtosis tells about the tails of the residual
distribution. If (NIST/SEMATECH, 2012):
•

kurtosis > 3, heavy-tailed distribution

•

kurtosis <3, light-tailed distribution

Omnibus and Prob(Omnibus)
Omnibus value tells about the skewness and kurtosis of the residuals. The ideal value
should be close to zero to indicate the normality of the residuals. The Prob(Omnibus) suggests
that the probability of the residuals is normally distributed. In an ideal case, it is expected to be
close to one (McCarty, 2018).
Durbin-Watson
The Durbin-Watson value says the measure of autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson test
ranges from zero to four. If the value is (Kenton, 2019):
•

2, no autocorrelation

•

Between 0 and 2, positive autocorrelation

•

Between 2 and 4, negative autocorrelation
The Durbin-Watson test also tells about the homoscedasticity; the value is expected to be

between one and two (McCarty, 2018).
Jarque-Bera/ Prob(JB)
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Jarque-Bera test is a measure of the normality of the residuals. It tests both skewness and
kurtosis. It follows a similar pattern with Omnibus values (McCarty, 2018).

3.5 Generalizability of the Research
The outputs of research are as useful as used by others. The generalizability of research
defines the effectiveness and usefulness of the research. According to Polit & Beck (2010)
generalizability is a study of reasoning which deduces broad inferences from specific
observations.
Generalizability is a fundamental element of research and convinces the usefulness of
research (Lee & Baskerville, 2003). Ensuring the generalizability is a way to broaden the
applicability of the findings of a research.
A statistical generalization is a common form of generalization methods. The sample to
be used should satisfactorily represent the population to have successful generalizability.
Random sampling can increase the chance of the sample representing the population.
Gliner et al. (2017) define research validity as the merit of the whole study, includes
measurement reliability and statistics, internal validity, overall measurement validity of the
constructs, and external validity.
They describe the research validity as below:
1. Measurement reliability and statistics
a. Test-retest reliability
b. Parallel forms reliability
c. Internal consistency reliability
d. Interrater reliability
2. Internal Validity
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a. Equivalence of groups on participant characteristics
b. Control of extraneous experience or environmental variables
3. Measurement validity and generalizability of the constructs
a. Face validity
b. Content validity
c. Criterion-related validity
d. Construct validity
4. External validity
a. Population validity
b. Ecological validity
Reliability discusses if score to items on an instrument is consistent, stable over time, and
there is a consistency.
Internal validity can be defined as "the approximate validity which we can infer that a
relationship is causal" (Campbell & Cook, 1979). Internal validity is shaped by the strength or
soundness of the design and influences if a researcher can deduce that the predictor variable
caused change on the response variable.
Measurement Validity and generalizability of the constructs
Validity is an establishment of evidence for the use of a specific instrument in a particular
setting. An instrument may have high reliability, yet, it may not be valid. The instrument should
measure what it is supposed to measure. The authors cover four different types of evidence for
validity.
1. Face validity: an instrument has face validity if the content seems to be suitable for the
instrument. Face validity does not define the content.
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2. Content validity: it denotes the actual content of the instrument. The content creates the
instrument that is representative of the concept that one is trying to measure. The first
step of establishing content validity is a definition of the concept that the researcher is
trying to measure. A second step to content validity is a literature search to find out how
this concept is embodied in the literature.
3. Criterion-related validity: It is the validation of the instrument against the external
criterion. This validation method contains establishing a correlation coefficient between
the instrument and the external criterion. There are two types of criterion validity:
a. Predictive evidence: examines the relationship between the response and predictor
variables to predict future performance.
b. Concurrent evidence: examines the relationship between variables
4. Construct validity: construct validation is a process where researchers carry out studies to
demonstrate that the instrument is measuring a construct.
External validity
A research study should have a high rate of external validity, or the researcher should at
least be cautious about generalizing the findings to other measures, populations, and settings.
External validity seeks the question of generalizability: "To what populations, settings, treatment
variables, and measurement variables can this effect be generalized." (D. T. Campbell & Stanley,
1967).
The representativeness of the sample determines the external validity. However, the
sampling design or the type of sampling does not directly affect the internal validity of a study.
External population validity is affected by sampling design; however, internal validity depends
on how subjects get into groups.
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Population external validity should be based on rating on the following criteria
1. representativeness of accessible population vis-à-vis theoretical population
2. adequacy of sampling method from the available population
3. sufficiency of the response or return rate
Ecological external validity should be based on:
1. the naturalness of setting or conditions
2. adequacy of rapport with testers or observers
3. the naturalness of procedures or tasks
4. appropriateness of timing and length of treatment
5. the extent to which results are restricted to a specific time in history
This research aims to develop an approach to predict the cost of PII data breach by
employing multiple regression. First, the scarcity of available data is an issue for this study due
to the lack of formality in data breach reporting. The nature of the study requires criterion-related
validity to have valid research. To achieve generalizability, we will select all available data of
massive data breach and check statistical tests as adjusted and predicted R2, PRESS, Cook's D,
F-test, t-test, Mallows' Cp to make inference about the population.
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CHAPTER 4
MODEL DEVELOPMENT
4.1 Introduction
This chapter covers how the dataset is developed, existing datasets are compared,
characteristics of the developed dataset, how variables are defined, why multiple regression is
used, and the outputs of the developed models.

4.2 Data Collection and Variables
This study only focuses on data breaches, where the number of affected people is more
than one million. A multiple regression model will be developed for the data breach impact will
be based on the developed dataset. The incidents are acquired from the PRC dataset as of
November 4, 2018. The developed dataset does not include government organizations, nonprofits, educational institutions, or unknown organizations in the PRC dataset, which were listed
as ‘EDU,’ ‘GOV,’ ‘NGO,’ ‘UNKN.’ This study will include data breach incidents that happened
in Finance, Insurance, Retail, Online Retail, Healthcare industries, and other businesses. Those
are listed as ‘BSF,’ ‘BSO,’ ‘BSR,’ and ‘MED.’ Also, this study includes any type of PII
disclosure, either intentional or accidental. Then, the data is filtered according to the criteria
above from 2005 to November 4, 2018. As a result, 133 distinct data breach incidents occurred
between those dates. In addition to that, the AOL data breach happened in 2004 is added into the
dataset. As a result, the dataset includes 134 distinct data breach cases in total in which the
number of affected people is more than one million. Next, the information sought for each case
for the following parameters per incident:
•

Cost types and its amount in $
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•

Type and number of stolen data
o PII: the sum of number of names, address, phone number, date of birth, and so on
o Sensitive PII (SPII): the sum of number of social security number, driver’s license
numbers, passport numbers, and so on

•

The legal status of the case: the class-action lawsuit is dismissed or concluded

•

Revenue for the year in $ that data breach happened
This study compares the PRC numbers with ITRC and website sources to be sure about

the number of affected people. Company quarterly and annual reports, SEC filings, news media,
websites, and case studies are reviewed. The number of affected people for ‘Neiman Marcus’
data breach was reported for more than one million. However, this study finds out that the
number of affected people is later reported 370,000. Therefore, the Neiman Marcus data breach
case is excluded from the list. Regarding the parameters mentioned above, 31 data breach cases
have information about the parameters. Therefore, our data breach sample size is 31.
This study mostly focuses on the impact of the data breach on the U.S. citizens, and the
companies are publicly traded in the U.S. stock markets. The reason is that the U.S. has welldefined laws, regulations, and agencies to monitor data breach incidents. However, for the
Marriot data breach, this study added the fine of GDPR for the company to the total cost because
there has not been data breach settlement or fines issued by U.S. courts or agencies. Moreover, it
is not clear how many U.S. citizens are affected by that data breach. Therefore, all number of
stolen records are included in the table. Next, this study only considers the number of U.S. and
Israel Yahoo account users because of the data breach settlement and fees cover only those two
countries. It is not difficult to reach the sought information for public companies. However, there
is limited information regarding the data breach for private companies or companies that are not
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traded in U.S. stock markets. For example, Uber was not a public company when the breach
happened; therefore, we only know the cost of settlement, which is $148 million. Also, for older
cases, we have not found the revenue information of the company for the breach year due to
bankruptcy or acquisition. Therefore, we have recorded the next available revenue information or
parent firm revenue.

4.2.1 Calculation of number of the PII and the SPII
The current data breach cases are reported based on the number of affected people.
However, in this model, we will categorize the stolen data into PII, which is low critical data,
and SPII, which is highly critical data. Also, in most cases, the victim companies report only the
number of affected people and categorically type of stolen information. Therefore, in many
cases, we do not have the exact number of stolen data for each PII or SPII type. However, we
know the number of affected people and the type of stolen PII and SPII. Therefore, we take each
PII or SPII type equal to the number of affected people unless the number of records for each PII
or SPII is stated. For example, in Anthem data breach, we know the number of affected people is
78, 800,000. We also know the stolen type of PII and SPII for Anthem:
•

Number of records for the name: 78, 800,000

•

Number of records for address: 78, 800,000

•

Number of records for SSN: 78, 800,000

For the example purpose, the total number of records is calculated below:
•

Total number of PII records exposed in Anthem breach: 157,600,000

•

Total number of SPII records exposed in Anthem breach: 78,800,000
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Table 9. Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable

Type

Denotation

Definition

Total Cost

Dependent
variable

Y

The estimated cost of a data breach

Revenue

Independent
variable

X1

Yearly revenue of the company at $

High critical
data

Independent
variable

X2

Total number of SPII (e.g., SSN, credit card numbers) in
numbers

Low critical
data

Independent
variable

X3

Total number of PII (e.g., name, address) in numbers

Class-action
lawsuit

Independent
variable

X4

Binary variable ( 1 or 0; 1 means if there is a lawsuit)

4.3 Multiple Regression Models
This study uses multiple regression model to define the association between dependent
and independent variables and also to develop a predictive model to estimate the monetary
impact of a PII data breach. Developing a multiple regression model has several benefits (James
et al., 2017):
•

Interpretability of the model

•

A small number of predictor variables

•

Small sample size

•

If there is a linear relationship between response and predictor variables

Multiple regression modelling provides so many advantages. However, on the other hand, to
develop a multiple regression model, the assumptions below must be met (James et al., 2017):
•

Less flexibility of the model

•

The relation between response and predictor variable must be linear

•

Residuals need to be normally distributed
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•

There should be no multicollinearity among predictor variables

•

In the case of heteroscedasticity, the different transformation of the dependent variable is
sought.
In this study, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is used to develop models. OLS models

presume that the analysis is fitting a model of a linear relationship between independent and
dependent variables that minimizes the sum of square error (Zdaniuk, 2014).
Backward elimination is that running the model with all independent variables, then, in
each run, removing a statistically non-significant variable.
E(Y) = β0 + β1X1 + β2 X2 + β3X3 + β4X4
E(Y): Expected total cost of PII data breach in $
β0: constant where X equals to zero
X1: Revenue, in $
X2: High critical data were stolen: Combined data of SPII in number
X3: Low critical data were stolen: PII in numbers
X4: Binary variable (1 or 0; 1 means if there is a lawsuit)

4.3.1 Exploratory Data Analysis
Initially, exploratory data analysis is performed to see the linearity and distribution of the
variables and characteristics of the dataset.
Summary of the Dataset
There are 31 massive data breach incidents in the table. The dataset covers the incident
from 2004 to 2018. The industries included in the dataset are; medical, finance, retail, online
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retail, and other businesses. Also, the dataset provides information about the class-action lawsuit
status of the companies. Swarm plots below illustrate the data breach cost per industry, classaction lawsuit per industry, and the data breach per industry.
Figure 4 shows that the cost of a data breach per industry. In the medical industry, the
Anthem case has the highest cost amount. For BSO- other businesses- is Yahoo, and for the
finance industry, Equifax is the outlier.

Figure 4. Cost of Data Breach per Industry ($ in millions)
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Figure 5 shows that 19 cases have a class action lawsuit concluded. In 12 cases, there
currently are not any class-action lawsuit.

Figure 5. Class-action Lawsuit per Industry
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Figure 6 shows the massive data breach per industries over the years. It seems the
medical industry was the point of interest of hackers in 2015. However, since 2015, any massive
data breach in the medical industry is not observed. The number of incidents per industry is close
to each other.

Figure 6. Data Breach per Industry
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The discrepancy between data breach cost, the revenue of the companies, and the number
of records stolen are very high. The summary of the numeric variables provided in table 10.

Table 10. Summary Statistics
Revenue ($)

Total number of
PII records

Total number of
SPII records

Total Cost ($)

Mean

17,832,960,000

165,991,300

22,838,880

172,640,000

Std. deviation

28,440,830,000

267,261,000

39,396,670

273,120,000

Min

9,000,000

0

0

700,000

25%

1,312,000,000

3,050,600

0

7,050,000

50%

5,169,000,000

40,000,000

2,800,000

84,000,000

75%

17,871,500,000

213,800,000

36,425,000

235,000,000

Max

94,205,000,000

970,000,000

164,306,500

1,445,200,000

The pair plot of the variables provided below shows the distribution and the relationship
between the variables. The ‘Equifax’ case stands far away from the average.
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Figure 7. Pair Plot of the Variables
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The next figure shows the histogram of the data breach cost. Equifax is a unique case in
terms of the total cost. The majority of the data breach cost is concentrated between o and $300
million.

Figure 8. Histogram of Total Cost
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Figure 9 shows that most of the companies have revenue from $9 million to $20$ billion.
Nevertheless, very few data points have revenue between $70 billion to $94 billion.

Figure 9. Histogram of Revenue
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Figure 10 illustrates the distribution of the number of stolen PII records. The number of
stolen PII records is shown in scientific notation. The majority of the data breach is concentrated
between 0 and 100 million.

Figure 10. Histogram of PII
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Figure 11 shows the distribution of the number of stolen SPII records. The number of
stolen SPII records are shown in scientific notation. The majority of the data is concentrated
between 0 and 25 million.

Figure 11. Histogram of SPII
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The proposed model has one categorical variable, which is the class-action lawsuit. To
include the categorical variable into the model, it is transformed into a binary variable.
Concluded cases are coded as 1. On the other hand, dismissed cases are coded as 0. As a result,
the class-action lawsuit variable has 19 ones (concluded case) but also 12 zeros (dismissed).
Figure 12 shows the distribution of the class-action lawsuits.

Figure 12. Histogram of Class-Action Lawsuits
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The linearity of the relationship
The figures below show a scatter plot of cost vs. revenue, PII, and SPII, respectively.
There is an acceptable level of linearity between cost and revenue. Only the Equifax case is far
away from the linear line.

Figure 13. Revenue vs. Total Cost
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The figure below shows the linear relationships between PII and the total cost. In this
figure, the Equifax is again, far away from the linear line. The number of stolen PII records are
shown in scientific notation. The scatter plot shows there is a linear relationship between PII and
the total cost.

Figure 14. PII vs. Total Cost
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The figure below shows the linear relationship between the SPII and the total cost. In this
figure, Equifax is again far away from the linear line. The number of stolen SPII records are
shown in scientific notation. The scatter plot shows there is a linear relationship between SPII
and the total cost.

Figure 15. SPII vs. Total Cost
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Correlation Matrix and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
The next multiple regression assumption is checking if there is multicollinearity among
the independent variables. Pearson correlations of the variables and VIF values are calculated
and shown below.
Table 11. Pearson Correlation Matrix

Revenue
PII
SPII
Class-action
Lawsuit
Cost

Revenue

PII

SPII

Cost

0.1397
0.1366
1
0.1435

Class-action
Lawsuit
0.0991
-0.0694
0.1435
1

1
0.2332
0.1397
0.0991

0.2332
1
0.1366
-0.0694

0.2111

0.4628

0.7147

0.1775

1

0.2111
0.4628
0.7147
0.1775

VIF Values intercept included:
Table 12. VIF values

VIF

Intercept

Revenue

PII

SPII

Class-action
lawsuit

3.3

1.08

1.08

1.05

1.04

As a rule of thumb, VIF values higher than five may pose multicollinearity. All VIF
values are below five. Both the correlation matrix and VIF table show that there is no sign of
multicollinearity among the independent variables. The next multiple regression assumptions
will be checked according to the model results.
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4.4 Models
A comparison of the valid models will be made in the next chapter. In this chapter, the
outputs of the hypothesized models and a summary are provided.
E(cost) = β0 + β1Revenue + β2 Pii + β3Spii+ β4Class-action
OLS Regression Results
Table 13. Model 1 Outputs
R-squared

0.659

Sample size

31

Jarque-Bera

12.432

Adj. R-squared
Predicted Rsquared

0.607

Df Residuals

26

Prob(JB)

0.0002

0

Df Model

4

Omnibus

8.789

AIC

1268

Skew

0.485

Prob(Omnibus)

0.012

BIC

1275

Kurtosis

5.947

Log-likelihood

-628.98

Mallow Cp

5

Durbin-Watson

2.184

F-statistic

12.58

t

p-value

PRESS

2.24464E+18

intercept

coefficient
-34,028,000

std err
55,900,000

revenue

0.0002

pii
spii
Class-action

-0.609

0.548

0.025
-149,000,000

0.975
80,900,000

0.001

0.187

0.853

-0.002

0.003

0.3854

0.122

3.165

0.004

.135

.636

4.468

0.815

5.484

0.000

2.793

6.142

60,096,800

64.421

0.933

0.359

-72,300,000

192,516,000

In the first multiple regression model, revenue, intercept, and class-action lawsuit
variable are statistically non-significant. The backward elimination rule suggests removing the
variable with the highest p-value, which is revenue in this case.
In the 2nd run, revenue is eliminated due to high p-value.
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Table 14. Model 2 Outputs
R-squared

0.659

Sample size

31

Jarque-Bera

11.015

Adj. R-squared

0.621

Df Residuals

27

Prob(JB)

0.004

Pred. R-squared

0.136

Df Model

3

Omnibus

8.151

AIC

1266

Skew

0.439

Prob(Omnibus)

0.017

BIC

1272

Kurtosis

5.785

Log-likelihood

-629

Mallow Cp

3

Durbin-Watson

2.21

F-statistic

17.38

t

p-value

PRESS

1.93228E+18

intercept

coefficient
-32,159,234

std err
54,000,000

pii

0.391

spii
Class-action

-0.595

0.557

0.025
-143,000,000

0.975
78,670,000

0.116

3.354

0.002

0.152

0.63

4.482

0.796

5.629

0.000

2.848

6.116

61,340,000

62,920,000

0.975

0.338

-67,757,000

190,444,000

In model 2, adjusted and predicted R-squared slightly increase. However, there are still
statistically not significant variables that intercept and class-action lawsuit variables.

Table 15. Model 3 Outputs
R-squared

0.755

Sample size

31

Jarque-Bera

17.61

Adj. R-squared

0.729

Df Residuals

28

Prob(JB)

0.000

Pred. R-squared

0.432

Df Model

3

Omnibus

10.649

AIC

1264

Skew

0.582

Prob(Omnibus)

0.005

BIC

1269

Kurtosis

6.505

Log-likelihood

-629

Mallow Cp

2

Durbin-Watson

2.199

F-statistic

28.81

PRESS

1.79373e+18
std err

t

p-value

pii

coefficient
0.3648

spii
Class-action

0.107

3.415

0.002

0.025
1.46e-07

0.975
5.84e-07

4.4003

0.775

5.676

0.000

2.81e-06

5.99e-06

35,330,000

44,750,000

0.789

0.436

-56,300,000

127,000,000
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In model 3, adjusted and predicted R-squared substantially increased; however, there is
still a statistically not significant variable that is the class action lawsuit.

Table 16. Model 4 Outputs
R-squared

0.847

Sample size

31

Jarque-Bera

1.979

Adj. R-squared

0.824

Df Residuals

27

Prob(JB)

0.379

Pred. R-squared

0.563

Df Model

4

Omnibus

3.393

AIC

1263

Skew

-0.425

Prob(Omnibus)

0.183

BIC

1266

Kurtosis

3.899

Log-likelihood

-629

Mallow Cp

3

Durbin-Watson

1.763

F-statistic

37.23

PRESS

1.38116e+18
coefficient
0.3255

std err

t

p-value

pii
spii
Class-action
Spii*classaction

0.087

3.754

0.001

0.025
0.148

0.975
0.503

1.3257

0.990

1.339

0.192

-0.706

3.357

-12,680,000

38,000,000

-0.333

0.741

-90,723,000

65,364,000

5.054

1.26

4.006

0.000

2.465

7.64

In model 4, the hypothesis is that there is an interaction between SPII and a class-action
lawsuit. It is observed that SPII data breaches are more likely to have class-action lawsuits,
which can significantly increase the total cost. Therefore, this model has four independent
variables that are PII, SPII, class-action lawsuit, SPII * class-action lawsuit. There is an
interaction between SPII and class-action variable, which means that SPII data breaches and
class-action lawsuit explains the change in the cost and strongly correlated.
According to the current dataset and independent variables, the highest adjusted Rsquared value occurred in the last model. However, the difference between adjusted and
predicted R-squared looks large enough, which may be a sign of overfitting. Although the SPII
and class-action lawsuit variables have high p-values, the interaction is statistically significant.
Due to the hierarchical principle, if we include the interaction in the model, we should include
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the main effects, which are SPII and class-action lawsuits. Since the rate of R-squared and
adjusted R-squared is reasonably high, the following figures will examine if the residual
distribution is normal to meet one of the multiple regression assumptions.
The figure below represents the residuals vs. fitted values. Hannaford, Equifax, and
Anthem seem to have the highest errors. In this figure, it is better to have a horizontal line, which
means there is homoscedasticity. Residuals are expected to appear equally variable across the
range of the predicted values.

Figure 16. Residual vs. Fitted Values for Model 4

The figure below represents a standardized residuals on Q-Q plot. The residuals are
expected to be on the line. However, cases in both tails violate the normality of the residuals. The

86
standardized residual shows how significant the data are to the chi-square value. For normally
distributed residuals, all the residuals are expected to be (+- 2) standard deviation of the mean,
which is zero. Also, those points should draw a linear line on a QQ-plot. However, there are
three data points beyond two standard deviations, which means that residuals are not normally
distributed.

Figure 17. Normal Q-Q Plot for Model 4
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The figure below shows the residuals vs. leverage plot. The plot helps to determine any
influential cases in the model. There should not be any data point in the upper right corner of the
plot. If there is a data point in the dashed lines, Cook’s distance, it might have an influential
impact on the regression model. Therefore, removing those would change the regression results.
In the table, there is not an outlier or influential data point that needs to be removed from the
dataset according to Cook’s distance.

Figure 18. Residuals vs. Leverage Plot for Model 4

Figure 19 represents the scale-location plot. It shows the residuals are spread equally
along with the ranges of explanatory variables. This helps to check the assumption of
homoscedasticity. If there is an equal variance, there should be a horizontal line with randomly
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spread points. However, in the figure, residuals do not form a horizontal line; instead, they begin
to spread wider as the fitted value increases. Therefore, it shows that there is a violation of
homoscedasticity.

Figure 19. Scale vs. Location Plot for Model 4
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The figure below shows the distribution of the residuals on a histogram. The residuals are
not normally distributed.

Figure 20. Histogram of the Residuals for Model 4

Breusch-Pagan test
A Breusch-Pagan test is carried out in Python by “statsmodels.” According to the
Breusch-Pagan test, there is a violation of homoscedasticity, which means that residuals are not
normally distributed.
H0: There is homoscedasticity
HA: there is heteroscedasticity
In the Breusch-Pagan test, the p-value is much smaller than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis
is rejected. The residuals do not have homoscedasticity.
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Removing the Outliers
In the next model, the outliers – Equifax and Anthem- are removed from the dataset. As a
result, the sample size is 29. The backward elimination is employed.

Table 17. Model 5 Outputs
R-squared

0.586

Sample size

29

Jarque-Bera

2.585

Adj. R-squared

0.518

Df Residuals

24

Prob(JB)

0.275

Pred. R-squared

0.089

Df Model

4

Omnibus

3.715

AIC

1150

Skew

0.213

Prob(Omnibus)

0.156

BIC

1157

Kurtosis

4.399

Log-likelihood

-570

Mallow Cp

5

Durbin-Watson

F-statistic

8.5

PRESS

4.42522E+17

intercept

coefficient
7,158,000

std err
32,480,000

revenue

0.0019

pii
spii
Class-action

t
0.221

p-value
0.827

0.025
-59,750,000

0.975
74,067,000

0.001

2.944

0.007

0.001

0.003

0.2938

0.072

4.072

0

0.145

0.443

1.3969

0.633

2.207

0.037

0.091

2.703

32,753,900

35,173,000

0.931

0.361

-39,839,000

105,347,000

The p-value of the intercept is very high in addition to the “class-action” variable. Also,
the “spii” variable is close to the alpha level. R-squared and adjusted R-squared are lower than
the previous models. In the next model, the intercept is removed.
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Table 18. Model 6 Outputs
R-squared

0.788

Sample size

29

Jarque-Bera

2.826

Adj. R-squared

0.743

Df Residuals

25

Prob(JB)

0.243

Pred. R-squared

0.57

Df Model

4

Omnibus

3.884

AIC

1148

Skew

0.209

Prob(Omnibus)

0.143

BIC

1154

Kurtosis

4.3471

Log-likelihood

-570

Mallow Cp

4

Durbin-Watson

2.214

F-statistic

21.96

PRESS

3.90180e+17
std err

t

p-value

revenue

coefficient
0.002

0.001

3.088

0.005

0.025
0.001

0.975
0.003

pii

0.3007

0.64

4.71

0

0.169

0.432

spii

1.4442

0.584

2.473

0.021

0.241

2.647

38,006,900

25,410,000

1.496

0.147

-14,326,000

90,340,000

Class-action

The R-squared, predicted, and adjusted R-squared are increased. However, the “classaction” variable is still more than the alpha level, which is 0.05. The “spii” variable now has a
lower p-value. In the next model, the “class-action” variable is taken out due to a higher p-value.
Table 19. Model 7 Outputs
R-squared

0.759

Sample size

29

Jarque-Bera

4.079

Adj. R-squared

0.731

Df Residuals

26

Prob(JB)

0.13

Pred.R-squared

0.515

Df Model

3

Omnibus

4.652

AIC

1149

Skew

-0.192

Prob(Omnibus)

0.098

BIC

1153

Kurtosis

4.797

Log-likelihood

-170

Mallow Cp

4.2

Durbin-Watson

2.159

F-statistic

27.23

PRESS

4.400069e+17
coefficient
0.0022

std err

t

p-value

revenue

0.001

3.574

0.001

0.025
0.001

0.975
0.004

pii

0.3156

0.065

4.891

0.000

0.183

0.448

spii

1.686

0.574

2.935

0.007

0.505

2.867
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Now, all the variables have a lower p-value and statistically significant, although Rsquared, predicted, and adjusted R-squared decrease. The interaction effect between the “spii”
and the “class-action” variables is not observed. The following figures show how the residuals
are distributed.
The following figure shows how the residuals are distributed on a histogram. The
skewness value is -0.192, which means the is slightly concentrated on the left side of the mean.

Figure 21. Histogram of the Residuals for Model 7
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Figure 22 is a Normal QQ plot of the residuals. There are residuals more than two and
even three, which means that a data point beyond three standard deviations.

Figure 22. Normal Q-Q Plot for Model 7

94
Figure 23 is residuals vs. fitted values. The residuals should follow a horizontal line. The
errors have been increasing as the fitted values increase. The model fails to predict the high-cost
values.

Figure 23. Residuals vs. Fitted Values Plot for Model 7
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The figure below illustrates residuals vs. leverage and Cook’s distance. There seems to be
no data beyond the dashed line in the model.

Figure 24. Residuals vs. Leverage plot for Model 7
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Figure 25 shows if residuals are spread equally along with the ranges of explanatory
variables. This figure helps us to check the assumption of equal variance. We expect to see if
there is a horizontal line with randomly spread points.

Figure 25. Scale vs Location Plot for Model 7

Breusch-Pagan Test
The test states that residuals are not normally distributed due to the very small p-value.
Hence, there will be a transformation of the dependent variable.
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Square Root Transformation of the Dependent Variable
Since all dependent variables are greater than zero, square root transformation is applied
to meet the multiple regression assumptions. The distribution of the dependent variable after the
square root transformation is shown below.

Figure 26. Distribution of the Cost After the Square-root Transformation
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Model 8 runs with all variables included. Next backward elimination will be implemented.

Table 20. Model 8 Outputs
R-squared

0.677

Sample size

31

Jarque-Bera

2.038

Adj. R-squared

0.627

Df Residuals

26

Prob(JB)

0.834

Pred. R-squared

0.366

Df Model

4

Omnibus

0.768

AIC

621

Skew

0.289

Prob(Omnibus)

0.681

BIC

629

Kurtosis

2.442

Log-likelihood

-305

Mallow Cp

5

Durbin-Watson

2.038

F-statistic

13.59

PRESS

1,323,695,117
std err

t

p-value

coefficient

0.025

0.975

intercept
revenue

3672
6.536e-08

1,664
3.41e-08

2.207
1.919

0.036
0.066

252
-4.64e-09

7,093
1.35e-07

pii

0.000012

3.63e-06

3.414

0.002

4.93e-06

1.98e-05

0.0001

2.43e-05

4.934

0.000

6.98e-05

0

1,034

1,918

0.539

0.594

-2.908

4,976

spii
Class-action

There are two statistically, not significant variables. Also, the difference between
adjusted and predicted R2 looks large.
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Model 9 is run after removing the class-action lawsuit variable. The results:

Table 21. Model 9 Outputs
R-squared

0.673

Sample size

31

Jarque-Bera

0.735

Adj. R-squared

0.637

Df Residuals

27

Prob(JB)

0.693

Pred. R-squared

0.40

Df Model

3

Omnibus

0.669

AIC

620

Skew

0.187

Prob(Omnibus)

0.716

BIC

625

Kurtosis

2.345

Log-likelihood

-306

Mallow Cp

3.3

Durbin-Watson

2.059

F-statistic

18.51

PRESS

1,249,528,573
std err

t

p-value

coefficient

0.025

0.975

intercept
revenue

4,265
6.726e-08

1,232
3.34e-08

3.462
2.012

0.002
0.054

1,738
-1.32e-09

6,793
1.36e-07

pii

0.000012

3.56e-06

3.421

0.002

4.87e-06

1.98e-05

spii

0.00012

2.37e-05

5.131

0.000

7.29e-05

0

There is still a statistically not significant variable. Also, adjusted and predicted R2 does
not improve.
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Model 10 is run after removing the revenue variable. The results:

Table 22. Model 10 Outputs
R-sq

0.624

Sample size

31

Jarque-Bera

1.008

Adj. R-sq

0.597

Df Residuals

28

Prob(JB)

0.604

Pred. R-sq

0.43

Df Model

2

Omnibus

1.537

AIC

622

Skew

-0.027

Prob(Omnibus)

0.464

BIC

626

Kurtosis

2.118

Log-likelihood

-94

Mallow Cp

5.2

Durbin-Watson

2.220

F-statistic

23.22

PRESS

1,177,745,822
std err

t

p-value

coefficient

0.025

0.975

intercept
pii

5,083
0.000014

1,225
3.65e-06

4.151
3.756

0.000
0.001

2,575
6.24e-06

7,592
2.12e-05

spii

0.000127

2.48e-05

5.119

0.000

7.61e-05

0

Now all variables are significant; however, adjusted R2 decreased, unlike predicted R2.
The difference between adjusted and predicted R2 is considerable; therefore, it is a sign of
overfitting.
Interaction between variables is performed. However, it is observed that there is not any
significant interaction among variables after the transformation of the dependent variable.
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In the next model, the interception is removed, and the model is run with all variables.

Table 23. Model 11 Outputs
R-sq

0.85

Sample size

31

Jarque-Bera

0.796

Adj. R-sq

0.828

Df Residuals

27

Prob(JB)

0.672

Pred. R sq

0.775

Df Model

4

Omnibus

1.861

AIC

625

Skew

0.289

Prob(Omnibus)

0.681

BIC

630

Kurtosis

3.531

Log-likelihood

-308

Mallow Cp

4

Durbin-Watson

1.825

F-statistic

38.27

PRESS

1,206,968,500
coefficient
7.872e-08

std err

t

p-value

revenue

3.58e-08

2.197

0.037

0.025
5.2e-09

0.975
1.52e-07

pii

0.000015

3.68e-06

4.056

0.000

7.37e-06

2.25e-05

spii

0.000128

2.56e-05

4.987

0.000

7.52e-05

0.000

3,832

1,538

2.491

0.019

675

6989

Class-action

All the variables in model 11 are statistically significant, and SPII, PII, and class-action
have strong positive correlations with the cost. Also, revenue has a positive correlation with data
breach cost but not as strong as the other variables. Adjusted and predicted R2 values are similar.
The following figure illustrates the distribution of the residuals. The histogram shows an
acceptable normal distribution.
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Figure 27. Histogram of the Residuals for Model 11
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The figure below shows the residual vs. fitted values. Global Payments company case has
the highest error. The line draws close to a horizontal line considering the sample size.

Figure 28. Residuals vs Fitted Values for Model 11
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The next figure shows the Normal Q-Q Plot. The points almost draw a straight line. Only
two cases- Anthem, and Hannaford-seem to be beyond (+-) standard deviation.

Figure 29. Normal Q-Q Plot for Model 11
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The next figure is residual vs. leverage. It shows if there is an influential data point that
changes the regression model. There is no data point beyond Cook’s distance, which means we
do not have an outlier in the model, according to Cook’s D.

Figure 30. Residual vs. Leverage Plot for Model 11
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The next figure tells about the Scale vs. Location. This plot shows that if residuals are
spread equally. The output gives the three cases; Anthem, Hannaford, and Global Payments.

Figure 31. Scale- Location Plot for Model 11
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According to the Breusch-Pagan test, the p-value is 0.07, which means residuals are
acceptably spread normally. However, outliers (Anthem and Hannaford incidents) are deleted for
the next two models.
Table 24. Model 12 Outputs
R-sq

0.77

Sample size

29

Jarque-Bera

0.056

Adj. R-sq

0.731

Df Residuals

24

Prob(JB)

0.972

Pred. R sq

0.55

Df Model

4

Omnibus

0.544

AIC

572

Skew

0.08

Prob(Omnibus)

0.762

BIC

579

Kurtosis

3.145

Log-likelihood

-281

Mallow Cp

5

Durbin-Watson

2.672

F-statistic

20.04

PRESS

875,863,086
std err

t

p-value

intercept

coefficient
1,535

1,540

0.997

0.329

0.025
-1,634

0.975
4,714

revenue

8.277e-08

3.06e-08

2.709

0.012

1.97e-08

1.46e-07

pii

1.596e-05

3.28e-06

4.865

0

9.19e-06

2.27e-05

0.0001

2.1e-05

6.258

0

8.8e-05

0.0000

2,603

1,692

1,539

0.137

-888

6,095

spii
Class-action

There are two statistically non-significant variables in the model. In the next, regression
model, the highest one, interception, is taken out.
Table 25. Model 13 Outputs
R-sq

0.90

Sample size

29

Jarque-Bera

0.495

Adj. R-sq

0.88

Df Residuals

25

Prob(JB)

0.781

Pred. R-sq

0.84

Df Model

4

Omnibus

1.469

AIC

571

Skew

0.212

Prob(Omnibus)

0.480

BIC

577

Kurtosis

3.48

Log-likelihood

-281.473

Mallow Cp

4

Durbin-Watson

2.713

F-statistic

56.4

PRESS

748,459,963
coefficient
8.951e-08

std err

t

p-value

revenue

2.98e-08

3.004

0.006

0.025
2.81e-08

0.975
1.51e-07
2.35e-05

pii

0.000017

3.01e-06

5.738

0

1.11e-05

spii

0.000136

2.06e-05

6.595

0

0.000093

3,765

1,225

3.073

0.005

1,242

Class-action

0.000178
6,289
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In the last model, R2, adjusted R2, and predicted R2 is significantly increased to 0.9 and
0.88, 0.84, respectively. All the variables are statistically significant. Therefore, the following
figures check the assumptions of homoscedasticity and normality of the residuals.
The next figure shows the histogram of the residuals of the last model. The distribution seems to
be reasonably normal.

Figure 32. Histogram of the Residuals for Model 13
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The next figure illustrates the residual vs. fitted values plot. The residuals should follow a
horizontal line. Average of the residuals should be zero, also, they should appear to be equally
variable across the entire range of fitted values.

Figure 33. Residuals vs Fitted Values Plot for Model 13
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The next figure shows the normal Q-Q Plot. There are only two data points that are
slightly beyond (+,-) 2 standard deviation. Nevertheless, the points mostly draw a linear line.

Figure 34. Normal Q-Q Plot for Model 13
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The next figure is the residuals vs. leverage plot. According to Cook’s D, there is no
outlier that appears beyond the dashed line. However, there is one data point that have a high
influence on the regression model.

Figure 35. Residuals vs Leverage Plot for Model 13
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The next figure is the Scale-Location plot. The plot shows if residuals are spread equally
along with the ranges of fitted values.

Figure 36. Scale- Location Plot for Model 13

According to the Breusch-Pagan test, the p-value is larger than 0,05. Therefore, it states
that residuals are normally distributed. All of the assumptions are acceptably met in this model.

Box-Cox Transformation
The normality of the residuals is one of the assumptions of multiple regression. When
the residuals do not show a normal distribution, Box-Cox transformation on the response
variable is an option to meet the requirement. Box-Cox transformation can be applied if the
response variable is positive.
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All values of λ are regarded, and the optimal value for the dataset is assigned. The
optimal value provides the best normal distribution curve. The transformation of the response
variable follows (Box & Cox, 1964):
Y (λ) = (yλ -1) / λ

if λ ≠ 0

Y (λ) = log y

if λ = 0

The dependent variable, total cost, is transformed with Box-Cox by “SciPy” library in Python to
have a more normal distribution. The optimal lambda value is determined as 0.1534 by the
SciPy library, which provides the best approximation of a normal distribution curve. The
histogram of the cost after Box-Cox transformation is illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 37. Histogram of the Cost After Box-Cox Transformation
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All predictor variables are included in the first model after the Box-Cox transformation
Table 26. Model 14 Outputs
R-sq

0.572

Sample size

31

Jarque-Bera

1.05

Adj. R-sq

0.506

Df Residuals

26

Prob(JB)

0.592

Pred. R-sq

0.39

Df Model

4

Omnibus

1.645

AIC

282

Skew

0.059

Prob(Omnibus)

.439

BIC

289

Kurtosis

2.106

Log-likelihood

-136

Mallow Cp

5

Durbin-Watson

2.017

F-statistic

8.684

PRESS

16,481
std err

t

p-value

coefficient

0.025

0.975

intercept
revenue

75
3.296 e-10

6.916
1.42e-10

10.827
2.328

0.00
0.028

60.667
3.86e-11

89.1
6.2e-10

pii

3.912e-08

1.51e-08

2.596

0.015

8.15e-09

7.01e-08

spii

3.585e-07

1.01e-07

3.556

0.001

1.51e-07

5.66e-07

0.1247

7.971

0.016

0.988

-16.26

16.509

Class-action

The class-action lawsuit has a very high p-value. Therefore, in the next model, it is taken out.
Table 27. Model 15 Outputs
R-sq

0.572

Sample size

31

Jarque-Bera

1.06

Adj. R-sq

0.524

Df Residuals

27

Prob(JB)

0.592

Pred. R-sq

0.44

Df Model

3

Omnibus

1.681

AIC

280

Skew

0.058

Prob(Omnibus)

.432

BIC

285

Kurtosis

2.101

Log-likelihood

-136

Mallow Cp

5.4

Durbin-Watson

2.018

F-statistic

12.02

std err

t

p-value

PRESS

15,173
coefficient

0.025

0.975

intercept
revenue

74.95
3.297e-10

5.092
1.38e-10

14.72
2.387

0.000
0.024

64.5
4.63e-11

85.4
6.13e-10

pii

3.909e-08

1.47e-08

2.66

0.013

8.94e-09

6.92e-08

spii

3.587e-07

9.79e-08

3.664

0.001

1.58e-07

5.6e-07
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R2 has not changed, but adjusted R2 slightly has increased. Although R2 and adjusted and
predicted R2 is slightly increased, all independent variables seem statistically significant. The
following figures tell about the residual distribution. The histogram shows a normal distribution.

Figure 38. Histogram of the Residuals for Model 15
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The Normal Q-Q plot is shown in the figure below. All of the standardized residuals are
within -+2. Breusch-Pagan Test is performed for the model. According to the test, the residuals
are normally distributed.

Figure 39. Normal Q-Q Plot for Model 15
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The next figure illustrates the Residual vs. Leverage plot. It is observed that there is not a
data point beyond the dashed lines.

Figure 40. Residuals vs. Leverage Plot for Model 15
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The next figure depicts the Residuals vs. Fitted values plot. The Hannaford case has the
highest residual.

Figure 41. Residuals vs Fitted Values Plot for Model 15
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The figure below shows how residuals are spread along with the ranges of predictors.

Figure 42. Scale-Location Plot for Model 15
In the next model, the intercept is removed.
Table 28. Model 16 Outputs
R-sq

0.79

Sample size

31

Jarque-Bera

0.096

Adj. R-sq

0.76

Df Residuals

27

Prob(JB)

0.953

Pred. R-sq

0.74

Df Model

4

Omnibus

0.725

AIC

332

Skew

-0.019

Prob(Omnibus)

0.696

BIC

338

Kurtosis

3.27

Log-likelihood

-162

Mallow Cp

4

Durbin-Watson

1.364

F-statistic

28.84

std err

t

p-value

PRESS

79,389

revenue

coefficient
6.021e-10

3.21e-10

1.877

0.07

0.025
-5.61e-11

0.975
1.26e-09

pii

9.079e-08

3.29e-08

2.758

0.01

2.32e-08

1.58e-07

spii

5.249e-07

2.29e-07

2.287

0.03

5.41e-08

9.96e-08

0.000

28.922

Class-action

57.1830

13.773

4.152

85.444
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We have an increased adjusted and predicted R2. The difference between adjusted and
predicted R2 is small. Only the revenue variable is slightly larger than the alpha value. Therefore,
two data points will be removed from the dataset for the following models.
Removing the outliers (Hannaford and Global Payments case)
Table 29. Model 17 Outputs
R-sq.

0.67

Sample size

29

Jarque-Bera

0.694

Adj. R-sq.

0.62

Df Residuals

24

Prob(JB)

0.707

Pred. R.sq

0.52

Df Model

4

Omnibus

0.604

AIC

208

Skew

-0.197

Prob(Omnibus)

0.739

BIC

215

Kurtosis

2.35

Log-likelihood

-99

Mallow Cp

5

Durbin-Watson

2.236

F-statistic

11.3

PRESS

12,576
std err

t

p-value

coefficient
intercept
revenue
pii
spii
Class-action

0.025

0.975

35.20
1.353e-10
1.91e-08
1.539e-08

2.965
5.46e-11
5.9e-09
3.88 e-08

11.87
2.478
3.3
3.96

0.000
0.02
0.003
0.001

29.085
2.26 e-11
6.93e-09
7.38e-08

41.324
2.48e-10
3.13e-08
2.34e-07

2.92

3.253

0.9

0.37

-3.786

9.64
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Since the class-action lawsuit variable is statistically not significant, it is removed for the
next model.
Table 30. Model 18 Outputs
R-sq

0.64

Sample size

29

Jarque-Bera

0.835

Adj. R-sq

0.60

Df Residuals

25

Prob(JB)

0.66

Pred. R sq

0.53

Df Model

3

Omnibus

1.039

AIC

207

Skew

-0.07

Prob(Omnibus)

0.6

BIC

212

Kurtosis

2.18

Log-likelihood

-99

Mallow Cp

4

Durbin-Watson

2.13

F-statistic

15

PRESS

12,378
std err

t

p-value

coefficient
intercept
revenue
pii
spii

37.09
1.404e-10
2.822e-08
1.578e-07

2.089
5.41e-11
5.79e-09
3.84e-08

17.265
2.596
3.145
4.106

0.000
0.016
0.004
0.001

0.025

0.975

32.788
2.9e-11
6.3e-09
7.87e-07

41.394
2.52 e-10
3.02e-08
2.37e-07

Although all variables have a p-value lower than 0.05, R2, predicted, and adjusted R2 is still low.
Therefore, in the next model, the intercept is taken out.
Table 31. Model 19 Outputs
R-sq

0.84

Sample size

29

Jarque-Bera

0.775

Adj. R-sq

0.81

Df Residuals

25

Prob(JB)

0.679

Pred. R sq

0.79

Df Model

4

Omnibus

1.259

AIC

262

Skew

-0.4

Prob(Omnibus)

0.533

BIC

267

Kurtosis

2.97

Log-likelihood

-127

Mallow Cp

4

Durbin-Watson

1.79

F-statistic

32

PRESS

57,625
std err

t

p-value

revenue
PII
SPII

coefficient
2.338e-10
4.443e-08
2.307e-07

Class-action

30.22

1.39e-10
1.41e-08
9.84e-07

1.687
3.146
2.345

0.10
0.004
0.027

0.025
-5.16e-11
1.53e-08
2.81e-08

5.911

5.11

0.000

18.05

0.975
5.19e-10
7.35e-08
4.33e-07
42.40
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Although we have a good adjusted and predicted R2 that explains the variance in the
response variable, we still have a statistically not significant variable. Since the revenue variable
is statistically not significant, it will be removed from the next model.
Table 32. Model 20 Outputs
R-sq

0.82

Sample size

29

Jarque-Bera

0.614

Adj. R-sq

0.80

Df Residuals

26

Prob(JB)

0.679

Pred. R sq

0.78

Df Model

3

Omnibus

0.736

AIC

263

Skew

-0.205

Prob(Omnibus)

0.786

BIC

267

Kurtosis

2.417

Log-likelihood

-128

Mallow Cp

4

Durbin-Watson

1.91

F-statistic

39.6

PRESS

61,305
coefficient
5.173e-08
2.514e-07

std err

t

p-value

pii
spii
Class-action

33.224

1.39e-08
1.01e-07

3.718
2.489

0.001
0.020

0.025
2.31e-08
4.37e-08

5.83

5.702

0.000

21.26

0.975
8.03e-08
4.59e-07
45.22

Now, all variables are statistically significant, and we have a good adjusted and predicted
R2 number. Therefore, the next figures will explore if the model meets the homoscedasticity
assumption.
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Breusch-Pagan test is employed to test if the residuals’ distribution is normal. The result
states that the distribution of the residuals is not normal.

Figure 43. Histogram of the Residuals for Model 20
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The next figure is a Q-Q plot. The residuals are expected to be on the line. For a normally
distributed residuals, all the residuals are expected to be within (+- 2) standard deviation of the
mean. All residuals are within (+-2) standard deviation; however, they do not draw a straight
line.

Figure 44. Normal Q-Q Plot for Model 20
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The next figure shows the residuals vs. fitted values. In this plot, there should be a
horizontal line to satisfy the homoscedasticity condition of the multiple regression assumptions.

Figure 45. Residuals vs Fitted Values Plot for Model 20
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The next plot shows residuals vs. leverage. Here, there should not be any dot beyond the
dashed line.

Figure 46. Residuals vs Leverage Plot for Model 20
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The figure below shows the scale-location plot to illustrate if the residuals are spread
equally along with the range of predictors. This plot helps to check the assumption of equal
variance. It is good if there is a horizontal line.

Figure 47. Scale- Location Plot for Model 20
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the results of the regression models are analyzed, and the developed
approaches to support the study are detailed. The following section examines and compares the
results of the multiple regression models. Then the models that explain the correlation between
dependent and independent variables are discussed. The chapter ends with discussing the
predictive potential of the models.

5.2 Comparison of the Models
The primary aim of the study is to test the correlation of the independent variables with
the dependent variables. The second goal is to develop a predictive model to estimate the cost of
massive data breaches. In this study, there are twenty multiple regression models developed and
tested to reach the goals. The comparison of the models is provided below grouped by the dataset
and transformation.
“√” states that the variables are statistically significant. “X” shows that the variables are
statistically not significant. Also, if the cell is blank, that means the variable is not included in the
model.
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Table 33. Comparison of the Models - Group 1
Model

R2

Adjusted
R2

Predicted
R2

F
stat

Mallow
Cp

intercept

Revenue

PII

SPII

Classaction

1

0.65

0.60

0

12.5

5

X

X

√

√

X

2

0.65

0.62

0.13

17.3

3

X

√

√

X

3

0.75

0.72

0.43

28.8

2

√

√

X

4

0.84

0.82

0.56

37.2

3

√

X

X

Spii-classaction
interaction
(√)

Models after outliers are removed:
Table 34. Comparison of the Models – Group 2
Model

R2

5
6
7

0.58
0.78
0.75

Adjusted
R2
0.51
0.74
0.73

Predicted
R2
0.08
0.57
0.51

F
stat
8.5
21.9
27.2

Mallow
Cp
5
4
4.2

intercept

Revenue

PII

SPII

X

√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√

Classaction
X
X
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Square Root Transformation of the Dependent Variable
Table 35. Comparison of the Models - Group 3
Model

R2

8
9
10
11

0.67
0.67
0.62
0.85

Adjusted
R2
0.62
0.63
0.59
0.82

Predicted
R2
0.36
0.40
0.43
0.77

F
stat
13.5
18.5
23.2
38.2

Mallow
Cp
5
3.3
5.2
4

intercept

Revenue

PII

SPII

√
√
√

X
X

√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√

√

Classaction
X

√

Models after outliers are removed:
Table 36. Comparison of the Models - Group 4
Model

R2

12
13

0.77
0.90

Adjusted
R2
0.73
0.88

Predicted
R2
0.55
0.84

F
stat
20
56.4

Mallow
Cp
5
4

intercept

Revenue

PII

SPII

X

√
√

√
√

√
√

Classaction
X
√

Box-Cox Transformation of the Dependent Variable
Table 37. Comparison of the Models - Group 5
Model

R2

14
15
16

0.57
0.57
0.79

Adjusted
R2
0.50
0.52
0.76

Predicted
R2
0.39
0.44
0.74

F
stat
8.6
12
28.8

Mallow
Cp
5
5.4
4

intercept

Revenue

PII

SPII

√
√

√
√
X

√
√
√

√
√
√

Classaction
X
√

131
Models after outliers are removed:
Table 38. Comparison of the Models - Group 6
Model

R2

17
18
19
20

0.67
0.64
0.84
0.82

Adjusted
R2
0.62
0.60
0.81
0.80

Predicted
R2
0.53
0.44
0.79
0.78

F
stat
11.3
15
32
39.6

Mallow
Cp
5
5.4
4
4

intercept

Revenue

PII

SPII

√
√

√
√
X

√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√

Classaction
X
√
√

The interaction effect is only seen in model 4. It means that the SPII data breaches may
trigger class-action lawsuits that can considerably increase the data breach cost. PII and SPII
variables are found statistically significant in all models. All independent variables except the
intercept are found statistically significant in models 11 and 13 and have a positive correlation.
Although model 16 and 19 have good values for adjusted and predicted R-squared and F
statistics, the revenue variable is the only one that’s p-value is slightly larger than 0.05.

5.3 Models with Correlation
This study only targets the data breaches, where the number of affected people is at least
one million. The goal here is to determine the correlation of the independent variables with the
dependent variables to identify the most relevant variables to forecast the massive data breaches.
Since the condition of the model is that number of affected people must be one million;
therefore, the X value at least is one million, even if the revenue variable is zero. Thus, in this
study, the intercept is not necessary. After the backward elimination is applied, specific models
include all variables except intercept to find out the correlation of the proposed variables.
All models state that PII and SPII are positively correlated with the data breach cost. In
model 5,6,7,11,12,13,14,15,17, and 18, the revenue variable is found to be positively correlated
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with the cost, too. However, class-action lawsuit variables only are found positively correlated
with the cost in model 11,13,16,19, and 20.
The independent variables explain the variance in the data breach cost in models 4, 11,
13, 16, 19, and 20 better than earlier models (Jacobs, 2014; Romanosky, 2016). Adjusted and
predicted R-squared proves that overfitting is seen in those models; also, F statistic, and t statistic
values show the correlation between the dependent and independent variables.

5.4 Models with Predictive Potential
In this section, the models are compared in terms of predictability. The sample size is
small to split the data as train and test to develop a predictive data breach cost model; therefore,
the study does not claim developing a predictive model. However, model 11 and 13 may have
predictive potential. The models are compared within their groups and summarized in the tables
below.
Model 4 has better values; however, the difference between adjusted R-squared and
predicted R-squared is substantial that may be a sign of overfitting. Also, the Residuals vs. Fitted
values plot shows that the residuals do not spread out normally. Therefore, in group 1, there is
not any model that has a predictive potential.
Table 39. Models with Predictive Potential Comparison – Group 1
Model

Adj. R2

Pred. R2

AIC

BIC

Mallow Cp

PRESS

1

0.60

0

1268

1275

5

2.24464E+18

2

0.62

0.14

1266

1272

3

1.93228E+18

3

0.72

0.43

1264

1269

2

1.79373E+18

4

0.82

0.56

1263

1266

3

1.38116E+18
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Outlier Removed
After the outliers are removed, the models in group 2 are not showing improvement. The
difference between predicted and adjusted squared is still considerable. Also, AIC and BIC
values are not much changed. Therefore, in group 2, there is not any model that has a predictive
potential.
Table 40. Models with Predictive Potential Comparison – Group 2
Model

Adj. R2

Pred. R2

AIC

BIC

Mallow Cp

PRESS

5

0.52

0.09

1150

1157

5

4.42522E+17

6

0.74

0.57

1148

1154

4

3.90180e+17

7

0.73

0.51

1149

1153

4.2

4.4e+17

Square Root Transformation of the dependent variable
After the square root transformation of the dependent variable, four models are
developed. In this group, model 11 looks promising. Although there is not a significant change in
BIC or AIC values PRESS value is low, and the difference between adjusted and predicted Rsquared is small, which means there is not overfitting.
Table 41. Models with Predictive Potential Comparison – Group 3
Model

Adj. R2

Pred. R2

AIC

BIC

Mallow Cp

PRESS

8

0.63

0.37

621

629

5

1,323,695,117

9

0.64

0.40

620

625

3.3

1,249,528,573

10

0.60

0.43

622

626

5.2

1,177,745,822

11

0.83

0.78

625

630

4

1,206,968,500

Outliers removed
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After removing the outliers, the model is improved on adjusted and predicted R-squared.
Also, in model 13, AIC and BIC are slightly improved compared to model 12 besides Mallow Cp
and PRESS value. Therefore, model 13 may have predictive potential.
Table 42. Models with Predictive Potential Comparison – Group 4
Model

Adj. R2

Pred. R2

AIC

BIC

Mallow Cp

PRESS

12

0.73

0.55

572

579

5

875,863,086

13

0.88

0.84

571

577

4

748,459,963

Box-Cox Transformation
The final transformation of the dependent variable is the Box-Cox transformation.
Although model 16 has better values for adjusted and predicted R-squared; however, AIC, BIC,
and PRESS values become worsen.

Table 43. Models with Predictive Potential Comparison – Group 5
Model

Adj. R2

Pred. R2

AIC

BIC

Mallow Cp

PRESS

14

0.51

0.39

282

289

5

16,481

15

0.52

0.44

280

285

5.4

15,173

16

0.76

0.74

332

338

4

79,389

Removing the Outlier
After removing the outlier, the models are improved, considering the adjusted and
predicted R-squared. However, AIC, BIC, and PRESS values are considerably increased. As a
result, there is not any model that has a predictive potential.
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Table 44. Models with Predictive Potential Comparison – Group 6
Model

Adj. R2

Pred. R2

AIC

BIC

Mallow Cp

PRESS

17

0.62

0.52

208

215

5

12,576

18

0.64

0.53

207

212

4

12,378

19

0.81

0.79

262

267

4

57,625

20

0.80

0.78

263

267

4

61,305

It may be inferred that models 11 and 13 may have predictive potential regarding the
adjusted and predicted R-squared, AIC, BIC, and PRESS values. The difference between
adjusted and predicted R-squared tells about overfitting. Predicted R-squared is showing how
well a model estimates response for new observations. It helps conclude when the model fits the
original data; however, less successful in estimating for new observations. Especially, model 13
has a very high adjusted and predicted R-squared that can explain the variance in the response
variable. The figure of residuals vs. fitted values, the probability of Omnibus values will be
compared for the models 11 and 13 to satisfy the homoscedasticity assumption of the multiple
regression. Ideal conditions for the normality of residuals and homoscedasticity are:
•

The difference between adjusted and predicted R-squared is small

•

Probability of Omnibus is close to 1

•

Breusch-Pagan test should give p-value is larger than 0.05

•

Residual vs. fitted should draw a horizontal line
Table 45. Predictive Model Comparison

Model

Adjusted R2

Predicted R2

Prob.
omnibus

11
13

0.82
0.88

0.77
0.84

0.68
0.48

Breusch-Pagan
test p-value >
0.05
yes
yes

Residual vs.
Fitted line
slightly
slightly
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the conclusions of this study, including a summary of the
dissertation and its main contributions. Also, several suggestions for future work are discussed.

6.2 Summary of the Study
This study presents significant results that demonstrate the correlations between revenue,
PII, SPII, and class-action lawsuits, and the dependent variable, which is the total cost of the data
breach. Also, specific models developed in this study are able to predict the responses for new
observations. Although the model fits the original data well; however, it is less qualified for
providing valid predictions for new observations, and the limited number of observations hinders
generalized conclusion. This study scrutinizes the type of information that is stolen from
organizations in data breach incidents; it introduces a model that explains the relation between
the stolen information and incurred costs due to a massive data breach. Furthermore, it elucidates
the magnitude of a massive data breach cost in monetary terms.
Types of stolen information and costs incurred after a massive data breach are illustrated
in the table below.
Table 46. Types of Costs and Stolen Information
Types of stolen PII
• Name
• Address
• Email
• Login information
• Non-sensitive medical
information

Types of stolen SPII
• Social security number
• Debit/credit card numbers
• Driver’s license numbers
• Tax ID
• Passport numbers
• Bank account numbers

Types of Cost
• Remediation
• Investigation
• Increase in cybersecurity
budget
• Fines, fees
• Data breach settlement
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•
•
•
•

Insurance membership
number
Employment information
Date of birth
Driver’s license state

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Professional services
Legal expenses
Credit/debit card reissuance
ID theft protection
Canceled business deals
Service unavailability
Reduction in bidding

The cost of data breaches in this study change from $0.65 million to $1,445 million, with
an average of $172 million. Among the possible causes for the small incurred cost is the lack of
regulations and agencies, and they were mostly PII data breaches. Also, among the 31
companies, only 11 companies had cyber-insurance, and the monetary range of the policies is
between $1 million and $125 million. The ratio of the insured amount to the total data breach
cost is between 0.02 and 1.00. The developed regression models show that there is a positive
linear correlation between dependent and independent variables. Model 13 looks promising due
to little difference between adjusted and predicted R2, which implies that overfitting is not an
issue.

6.3 Discussion of Contributions
This study introduces two new categories for personal information; these are PII and
SPII. This new taxonomy accentuates the impact of sensitive information, which is more costly
than not sensitive personal information. According to the models that are developed in this study,
SPII can increase the cost of a data breach ten times more than the PII. Thus, data breaches that
include sensitive information that may incur higher charges than non-sensitive data breaches.
Organizations store sensitive information that must be more careful while managing their
cybersecurity risk. They may need to invest more smartly in cybersecurity or purchase cyber
insurance to reduce the financial impact of sensitive data breaches. Besides, there is an
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interaction effect between SPII and class-action lawsuits. SPII data breaches may trigger more
class-action lawsuits, which may beget more financial harms, poor reputation, or loss of sale.
This study focuses on the number of stolen records based on the affected people. It
considers the type of stolen information and amount of it. The major contributions of the study to
the earlier works (Jacobs, 2014; Romanosky, 2016) are listed as:
•

Categorizing the information as PII and SPII

•

Distinguishing the stolen type of information and its amount

•

Including class-action lawsuits

•

Trying Box-Cox transformation and square-root transformation

•

Focusing on cases that the number of affected people is more than one million
Among 31 victim companies, only 11 companies had cyber-insurance ranging from $1

million to $125 million. The ratio of the insured amount to the total cost is between 0.02 and
1.00. The ratio becomes higher as the incidents become recent and cyber risk becomes more
understandable. Therefore, cyber-insurance is undoubtedly helpful in reducing the financial
impact of the data breach. While the cyber-insurance market is growing, the criticality of the
cyber-insurance may depend on the data-owning company. This new insurance notion is not one
size fit them all situation; for example, the more critical the nature of the data, the more
indispensable the cyber-insurance need.
A U.S. court approved that web-scraping without permission is legal (Mehta, 2019).
Besides, some of the recent verdicts of lawsuit cases indicate that a victim must have financial or
other types of harm to get compensation from the data-owning companies due to a data breach
(Hong, 2016). Therefore, this verdict indicates that the data breaches that involve PII or publicly
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available information will result in less cost to involving companies. However, the companies
that possess sensitive personal information or SPII must store, use, or transmit data by
maintaining the necessary security protocols. As a result, cyber-insurance will be a means to
mitigate the financial risk that is associated with data or information. This also means that
companies are in this category, may be required to more cognizant while buying cyberinsurance. The models developed in this study and introduced new categorization of the
information provide a more comprehensive understanding of the monetary impact of a data
breach; for example, the potential impact of a data breach can be better estimated with these
models that capitalize on the type and number of stored information. In addition, the insured
amount can be compared with the potential data breach impact; as a result, a determination of
under or over-insured can be made.
From the insurer perspective, the study may guide insurance firms while distinguishing
between high and low-risk cyber-insurance customers. Companies that store PII have
significantly less data breach costs compared to SPII data breaches because of the legality of
web-scraping and unproven harm of PII data breaches. Furthermore, the developed models
demonstrate that SPII loss increases the cost of a data breach up to ten times than PII loss.
Therefore, companies own not sensitive personal information may be grouped under low-risk
cyber-insurance customers.
On the other hand, companies that store sensitive information such as SSN, bank
account, passport number may face much higher costs in case of an SPII data breach. As a result,
they may face severe financial consequences due to class-action lawsuits, a settlement with
governments, or technical costs. Therefore, cyber-insurance firms may use the categorization of
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the information as PII and SPII to distinguish the clients as a low-risk customer and high-risk
customer depending on the data the customers keep.

6.4 Future Research
Cyber-risk management has become more complicated, sophisticated, and multi-faceted
in today’s complex information ecosystem. Financial, customer relations, legal, and social
aspects are becoming very important in addition to the technical aspect of cyber-risk
management. Therefore, any cybersecurity failure is much more than a technical issue. This
study investigates the financial impact of personal information data breaches by categorizing
data as PII and SPII. The monetary impact of cyber-risk is a new field that needs to be examined.
Few studies exist for data breach cost modeling. This study offers a foundation to address data
breach cost forecasting. Areas for future research include the following:
•

The monetary impact of availability and integrity compromise: This study only focuses
on confidentiality breaches. However, integrity and availability attacks may cause a
significant amount of loss. Identification of the factors to develop cost models for
integrity and availability attacks is still an open area for further research.

•

Likelihood of data breaches: This study addresses the impact part of data breach risk.
Extending this study by addressing the uncertainty aspect, which is calculating the
likelihood of data breaches, will give a more accurate data breach risk calculation.

•

Models at different intervals: This study considers the cases where the number of affected
people is more than one million. However, the number of affected people in the majority
of the cases are less than one million. Therefore, another study would be useful to
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develop a cost model for different intervals, such as a model where the number of
affected people is between:
o 0-10,000
o 10,000 – 100,000
o 100,000 – 1 million
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